Core Criminal Procedure by Koh, Steven Arrigg
Boston College Law School 
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School 
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers 
11-23-2020 
Core Criminal Procedure 
Steven Arrigg Koh 
steven.koh@bc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and 
the Human Rights Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Steven Arrigg Koh. "Core Criminal Procedure." Minnesota Law Review 105, no.1 (2020): 251-315. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital 

































Chen,	 Tom	 Dannenbaum,	 Laurel	 Davis,	 Brandon	 Garrett,	 Jeff	 Gordon,	 Rebecca	
Hamilton,	 Robert	 Howse,	 Sun	 Kim,	 Harold	 Hongju	 Koh,	 Kay	 Levine,	 Yael	 Lifshitz,	
Cortney	Lollar,	Travis	Pantin,	Daniel	Richman,	Diane	Ring,	David	Sloss,	and	Katharine	
Young	for	their	invaluable	insights	and	contributions	to	this	piece,	as	well	as	to	Ellie	








To	 what	 criminal	 procedural	 standard	 do	 we	 hold	 another	
country?1	At	first	blush,	one	answer	is	intuitive:	hold	other	countries	
to	the	same	fundamental	rights2	enumerated	here	in	the	United	States.	
This	 procedure	 is	 enshrined	 in	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution,	 codified	 in	
statute,	and	articulated	in	case	law.	Formally,	criminal	defendants	are	
entitled	 to	 individual	 rights	 such	 as	 freedom	 from	 unreasonable	
search	 and	 seizure;	 guarantees	 to	 a	 speedy	 and	 public	 trial	 by	 an	
impartial	 jury;	and	freedom	from	cruel	and	unusual	punishment.	 In	
our	 era	 of	mass	 incarceration,	 such	 formal	 rights	 are	 under	 attack	




a	 jurisdiction	 evaluating	 foreign	 sovereigns	 and	 international	 criminal	 systems.	
Another	way	of	phrasing	this	question	could	be	“to	what	criminal	procedural	standard	
should	the	U.S.	criminal	justice	system	hold	itself	when	engaging	with	foreign	criminal	
justice	 systems?”	This	question	 is	 thus	 related	 to,	but	distinct	 from,	 the	matter	of	a	
global	criminal	procedural	standard,	such	as	that	of	the	international	criminal	courts	
establishing	 their	 rules	 of	 procedure	 and	 evidence,	 see	 generally	KARIM	A.A.	KHAN,	












criminal	 justice	 system	 and	 why	 they	 are	 barriers	 to	 addressing	 the	 structural	





REV.	 1693	 (2017)	 (laying	 out	 “thirty	 proposals	 for	 the	 democratic	 criminal	 justice	











procedural	 framework.	 Today,	 all	 three	 branches	 now	 engage	 in	 a	
criminal	procedural	line	drawing	in	which	fundamental	rights	are	no	






The	 United	 States	 indicts	 and	 arrests	 a	 U.S.	 citizen	 on	 drug	
trafficking	charges.	Before	her	trial,	she	moves	to	suppress	evidence	
that	 Canadian	 law	 enforcement	 obtained	 in	 Montreal	 without	 a	
warrant	and	subsequently	turned	over	to	U.S.	law	enforcement.4	The	
court	denies	her	motion	to	suppress	on	the	ground	that	Canadian	law	
enforcement’s	 actions	 did	 not	 “shock	 the	 judicial	 conscience”5	 and	
thus	did	not	violate	her	Fourth	Amendment	right.6	
Switzerland	 convicts	 in	 absentia	 a	 U.S.	 citizen	 for	 committing	
securities	 fraud	 in	 Zurich	 and	 then	 requests	 that	 the	 United	 States	
extradite	 him	 to	 Switzerland	 to	 serve	 his	 sentence.	 The	 fugitive	
challenges	the	extradition	before	a	U.S.	magistrate	judge,	arguing	that	
the	Swiss	conviction	without	his	physical	presence	violated	his	rights	
to	 confront	 witnesses	 and	 to	 speedy	 trial.7	 The	 judge	 rejects	 his	




distribute.	 At	 sentencing,	 the	 government	 moves	 for	 an	 upward	


























American	 criminal	 procedure	 is	 the	 presence	 of	 counsel	 at	 all	
significant	stages	of	the	criminal	proceeding.”11	
These	 examples	 illustrate	 the	 central	 problem	 of	 this	 Article:	
what	happens	when	the	United	States	compromises	on	rights	in	order	





working	 practices—to	 assist	 other	 countries	 in	 their	 criminal	 law	
enforcement	mandates.13	Inversely,	these	relationships	also	give	rise	
to	 “foreign	affairs	prosecutions,”14	 or	U.S.	 criminal	 cases	with	 some	
foreign	nexus.	As	I	have	argued	previously,	such	cases—such	as	the	El	











of	 counsel	 at	 all	 significant	 stages	 in	 the	 American	 criminal	 proceeding,	 and	 what	
analysis	we	can	make	of	the	Mexican	procedures,	as	they	affected	Mr.	Moskovits,	would	
show	the	Careo	hearings	to	have	been	crucial.”).	
	 12.	 Steven	 Arrigg	 Koh,	Foreign	 Affairs	 Prosecutions,	 94	N.Y.U.	 L.	 REV.	 340,	 354	
(2019)	(noting	a	significant	rise	in	cases	involving	foreign	activity).	




What	 Comes	 Next,	 JUST	 SEC.	 (Dec.	 10,	 2018),	 https://www.justsecurity.org/61799/	
huawei-arrest-happened	 [https://perma.cc/8TY9-HPBR].	 International	 criminal	
tribunals	 are	 also	 recognizing	 the	 need	 to	 foster	 cross-border	 law	 enforcement	
cooperation	 to	 provide	 accountability	 for	 crime.	 See	 Theodor	 Meron,	 Closing	 the	
Accountability	Gap:	Concrete	Steps	Toward	Ending	Impunity	for	Atrocity	Crimes,	112	AM.	
J.	INT’L	L.	433,	441–42	(2018)	(discussing	steps	that	state	actors	and	agencies	may	take	
to	 facilitate	 prevention	 and	prosecution	 of	 atrocity	 crimes);	 see	 also	 Geoff	Dancy	&	







the	 nature	 of	 such	 criminal	 procedural	 rights	 and	 duties	 in	 the	
transnational	context.16	Most	of	the	literature	that	has	addressed	this	
question—including	 extradition	 and	 the	 rule	 of	 non-inquiry,17	
recognition	 of	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments,18	 constitutional	
extraterritoriality,19	 personal	 and	 legislative	 jurisdiction,20	 cross-








contemporary	 era	 and	 does	 so	 by	 situating	 cross-border	 law	 enforcement	
developments	alongside	broader	contexts	of	constitutional	legal	history,	human	rights,	
and	political	theory.	





729,	732	 (1998)	 (analyzing	 the	 lack	of	 judicial	 involvement	 in	 extraditions	 and	 the	
effect	it	has	on	“procedural	protections”).	
	 18.	 Little	has	been	written	on	 the	recognition	of	 foreign	criminal	 judgments	at	
U.S.	sentencing,	and	what	has	been	written	has	generally	argued	that	courts	should	be	
more	 circumspect	 in	 their	 consideration	 of	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments	 but	 has	 not	
considered	 the	broader	question	of	 cross-sovereign	 criminal	procedural	 rights.	See,	
e.g.,	Nora	V.	Demleitner,	Thwarting	a	New	Start?	Foreign	Convictions,	Sentencing,	and	
Collateral	 Sanctions,	 36	U.	TOL.	L.	REV.	 505	 (2005)	 (arguing	 for	more	 limited	use	 of	
foreign	 conviction	by	U.S.	 courts	 at	 sentencing,	with	 concern	 for	whether	 a	 foreign	
conviction	demonstrates	a	risk	of	recidivism).	See	generally	A.	Kenneth	Pye,	The	Effect	
of	Foreign	Criminal	 Judgments	within	 the	United	States,	32	UMKC	L.	REV.	114	(1964)	
(discussing	 the	 ambiguity	 surrounding	 the	 effect	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments	 have	
within	the	United	States).	
	 19.	 Work	 on	 constitutional	 extraterritoriality	 has	 often	 proceeded	 from	 the	
perspective	of	the	history	of	American	empire	and	thus	constitutional	application	to	
U.S.	proceedings.	See,	e.g.,	KAL	RAUSTIALA,	DOES	THE	CONSTITUTION	FOLLOW	THE	FLAG?	THE	
EVOLUTION	 OF	 TERRITORIALITY	 IN	 AMERICAN	 LAW	 (2009)	 (discussing	 the	 evolution	 of	




Due	Process,	 116	COLUM.	L.	REV.	 625,	626	 (2016)	 (arguing	 for	due	process	 curbs	on	
personal	 jurisdiction	 in	 criminal	 cases);	 Michael	 Farbiarz,	 Extraterritorial	 Criminal	
Jurisdiction,	114	MICH.	L.	REV.	507,	516–17	(2016)	(describing	how	due	process	limits	
extraterritorial	legislative	jurisdiction).	
	 21.	 See	 generally	 L.	 Song	 Richardson,	Due	 Process	 for	 the	 Global	 Crime	 Age:	 A	
Proposal,	 41	 CORNELL	 INT’L	L.J.	 347	 (2008)	 (proposing	 a	 transnational	 due	 process	
256	 MINNESOTA	LAW	REVIEW	 [105:251	
	
authoritarian	 legal	 systems22—have	 all	 considered	 aspects	 of	 core	
criminal	 procedure	 and/or	 judicial	 engagement	 with	 foreign	 legal	
systems	without	 recognizing	 the	 same	overarching	phenomenon	at	
play	 descriptively	 or	 considering	 its	 normative	 implications.	
Meanwhile,	legal	scholarship	on	procedural	rights	has	done	so	outside	




policy	 reasoning,23	 but	 more	 recent	 critiques	 of	 the	 selective	
incorporation	 approach	 to	 “constitutionalization”	 of	 criminal	
procedure24	have	not	been	considered	in	contemporary	transnational	
criminal	debates.	The	limited	international	human	rights	scholarship	
on	 criminal	 procedural	 rights	 focuses	 primarily	 on	 national	
constitutional	 protections25	 and,	 more	 often,	 human	 rights	 before	
 
model	that	minimizes	foreign	policy	concerns	in	the	mutual	legal	assistance	context).	
	 22.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Mark	 Jia,	 Illiberal	 Law	 in	 American	 Courts,	 168	 U.	 PA.	 L.	 REV.	
(forthcoming	 2020)	 (manuscript	 at	 26–27)	 (on	 file	 with	 author)	 (“[C]ourts	 must	
sometimes	evaluate	foreign	law	or	institutions	.	.	.	.	Judges	may	have	to	assess	foreign	
laws	while	managing	discovery	or	while	 considering	 forum	selection	clauses,	 stays,	
and	 antisuit	 injunctions.	 Perhaps	 the	 most	 common	 ‘evaluative’	 doctrines	 in	 the	





in	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment:	 A	 Nine-Lived	 Cat,	 42	 OHIO	ST.	L.J.	 435	 (1981);	 Louis	
Henkin,	“Selective	Incorporation”	in	the	Fourteenth	Amendment,	73	YALE	L.J.	74	(1963);	
Lawrence	Rosenthal,	The	New	Originalism	Meets	the	Fourteenth	Amendment:	Original	
Public	 Meaning	 and	 the	 Problem	 of	 Incorporation,	 18	 J.	 CONTEMP.	 LEGAL	 ISSUES	 361	
(2009);	 Bryan	 H.	 Wildenthal,	 The	 Lost	 Compromise:	 Reassessing	 the	 Early	
Understanding	 in	 Court	 and	 Congress	 on	 Incorporation	 of	 the	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 in	 the	
Fourteenth	Amendment,	61	OHIO	ST.	L.J.	1051	(2000).	
	 24.	 See,	 e.g.,	William	 J.	 Stuntz,	The	Political	Constitution	of	Criminal	 Justice,	119	
HARV.	L.	REV.	 780,	781	 (2006)	 (“The	 constitutional	proceduralism	of	 the	1960s	and	
after	helped	 to	create	 the	harsh	 justice	of	 the	1970s	and	after.”);	Tracey	L.	Meares,	
Everything	 Old	 Is	 New	 Again:	 Fundamental	 Fairness	 and	 the	 Legitimacy	 of	 Criminal	
Justice,	3	OHIO	ST.	J.	CRIM.	L.	105,	113	(2005)	(“Codes	specify	rules,	not	norms.”).	
	 25.	 M.	 Cherif	 Bassiouni,	 Human	 Rights	 in	 the	 Context	 of	 Criminal	 Justice:	
Identifying	International	Procedural	Protections	and	Equivalent	Protections	in	National	
Constitutions,	 3	 DUKE	 J.	COMPAR.	&	 INT’L	L.	 235	 (1993)	 (establishing	 certain	 general	
principles	 of	 human	 rights	 protection	 for	 individuals	 in	 national	 criminal	 justice	




on	 the	 economic	 and	 social	 rights	 side.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Sital	Kalantry,	 Jocelyn	E.	 Getgen	&	




international	 criminal	 tribunals.26	 And	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 the	





to	 all	 criminal	 law	enforcement	 cooperation	with	other	nations.	To	
build	this	case,	Part	I	will	describe	how	all	three	government	branches	
have	evaluated	other	sovereigns	using	 this	core	criminal	procedure	
approach,	 which	 first	 emerged	 in	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 incorporation	 and	
international	 human	 rights	 engagement	 but	 now	 appears	 in	 novel	









for	 engagement	 with	 the	 International	 Criminal	 Court	 and	 newer	
international	investigative	mechanisms.	
Ultimately,	this	Article	makes	four	contributions.	First,	it	enriches	
historical	 and	 contemporary	understandings	of	 criminal	procedure,	
using	the	cross-border	law	enforcement	context	as	a	launching	point	
to	 explore	 how	 the	 U.S.	 government	 has	 negotiated	 criminal	
procedural	 questions	 over	 the	 last	 century.	 Second,	 this	 Article	
 







CRIM.	 L.	&	 CRIMINOLOGY	 983	 (2008)	 (considering	 the	 constitutionality	 of	 the	 Rome	
Statute	 provisions	 in	 the	 event	 of	 U.S.	 ratification	 of	 the	 Rome	 Statute	 of	 the	
International	Criminal	Court).	
	 27.	 See	Yuliya	 Zeynalova,	The	 Law	 on	 Recognition	 and	 Enforcement	 of	 Foreign	
Judgments:	Is	It	Broken	and	How	Do	We	Fix	It?,	31	BERKELEY	J.	INT’L	L.	150,	179	(2013)	
(noting	that	countries	must	acknowledge	arbitral	awards	as	binding	and	carry	them	
out	 in	 compliance	 with	 local	 procedural	 requirements);	 David	 Westin,	 Enforcing	
Foreign	Commercial	Judgments	and	Arbitral	Awards	in	the	United	States,	West	Germany,	
and	England,	19	LAW	&	POL’Y	INT’L	BUS.	325,	340	(1987)	(stating	that	foreign	judgments	




contributes	 to	 international	 law	 scholarship	 by	 showing	 how	 the	
United	States	creates	and	implements	bilateral	and	multilateral	treaty	
obligations	concerning	criminal	procedural	rights.	In	doing	so,	it	also	
provides	 some	 guidance	 for	 future	 government	 actors	 engaging	 in	
criminal	procedural	line	drawing	when	negotiating	treaties	or	other	
cross-border	 law	 enforcement	 agreements.	 Third,	 it	 adds	 to	 the	
literature	on	comparative	 law,	showing	how	functionalism	“touches	
down”	when	legal	systems	with	conflicting	criminal	procedural	norms	
interact	 in	 cross-border	 cases.28	 And	 finally,	 it	 uses	 a	 legal	







of	 evaluating	 which	 criminal	 procedural	 rights	 to	 require	 when	
criminal	cases	involve	another	sovereign.	As	a	descriptive	taxonomy,	
this	Part	will	describe	two	approaches	that	the	political	and	judicial	
branches	have	 taken	 in	such	 line	drawing.	First	 is	 the	core	criminal	
procedure	or	fundamental	rights	approach,	in	which	the	United	States	
guarantees	 certain—but	 not	 all—enumerated	 criminal	 procedural	
rights	 vis-à-vis	 another	 sovereign.	 Second	 is	 the	minimalist	 outlier	
approach,	 an	 ad	 hoc	 analysis	 that	 ignores	 criminal	 procedural	





inward	 to	 U.S.	 criminal	 cases.	 Furthermore,	 they	 arise	 at	 various	
stages	 of	 the	 criminal	 process,	 such	 as	 investigations,	 pre-trial	
litigation	regarding	admission	of	evidence,	and	at	sentencing.	And	yet	
all	ultimately	resolve	to	the	same	fundamental	issue—holding	foreign	
sovereigns	 to	 a	 certain	 criminal	 procedural	 standard—and,	
ultimately,	 to	 the	 central	 criminal	 justice	 concerns,	 namely,	 the	
carceral	deprivation	of	liberty	or,	at	the	extreme,	execution.		
 







The	 formal,	 applicable	 sources	 of	 law	 may	 also	 vary.	 Core	
criminal	procedure	arises	when	the	Supreme	Court	interprets	the	Bill	
of	Rights,	or	when	the	political	branches	negotiate	and	ratify	treaties	
related	 to	 international	 human	 rights	 or	 electronic	 evidence.	
Similarly,	 the	 “outlier”	 approach	may	 turn	 on	 interpretation	 of	 the	









To	 be	 clear	 at	 the	 outset:	 U.S.	 criminal	 procedure	 is	 not	 the	
paragon	 of	 criminal	 procedural	 perfection,	 and	 cross-border	 law	
enforcement	 cooperation	 is	 not	 the	 sole	 context	 wherein	 criminal	












has	 coincided	 with	 a	 relaxation	 of	 traditional	 Westphalian	 territorial	 doctrines;	




(describing	 the	warrant	 requirement	 as	 “basically	 unrecognizable”	 due	 to	 its	many	
exceptions).	







said	 in	 the	 last	half	 century—that	 the	Amendment	generally	 calls	 for	warrants	 and	
probable	 cause	 for	 all	 searches	 and	 seizures,	 and	 exclusion	 of	 illegally	 obtained	





trial,	 and	 the	 right	 to	 confront	 witnesses;35	 more	 generally,	 guilty	
pleas	 short	 circuit	many	 rights	 individual	defendants	may	assert	 in	
our	criminal	justice	system.36	Additionally,	defendants	may	not	assert	
Fourth	 Amendment	 claims	 on	 collateral	 review	 of	 state	 criminal	
convictions	 in	 federal	 habeas	 corpus	 proceedings,	 given	 that	 the	
Supreme	Court	has	ruled	that	the	exclusionary	rule	is	a	prophylactic	
remedy.37	Relatedly,	the	same	applies	to	judicial	restrictions	on	Bivens	




Pursuant	 to	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach,	 the	 United	
States	 guarantees	 certain—but	 not	 all—enumerated	 criminal	
procedural	 rights	 vis-à-vis	 another	 sovereign.	 This	 approach	 has	









	 36.	 See	 FREDERICK	 T.	 DAVIS,	 AMERICAN	 CRIMINAL	 JUSTICE:	 AN	 INTRODUCTION	 80	
(2019)	(noting	that	U.S.	criminal	procedural	rights	are	premised	on	the	assumption	
that	 a	 trial	 will	 take	 place,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 is	 an	 increasingly	 uncommon	
occurrence).	
	 37.	 See	Stone	v.	Powell,	428	U.S.	465,	493	(1976)	(“There	is	no	reason	to	believe,	
however,	 that	 the	 overall	 educative	 effect	 of	 the	 exclusionary	 rule	 would	 be	












to	 adopt	 alternative	 remedies	 for	 resolving	 legal	 complaints.	See	Gregory	C.	 Sisk,	A	












found	 that	 a	 state’s	 denial	 of	 counsel	 deprived	 due	 process	 in	 the	
infamous	 Scottsboro	 trial,	 a	 capital	 case	 involving	 two	 African	
Americans	convicted	of	rape	without,	 inter	alia,	 the	assistance	of	an	
attorney	 at	 trial.42	 In	 holding	 that	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	
protects	 fundamental	 rights,	 the	 Court	 emphasized	 that	 such	
protection	was	“not	because	those	rights	are	enumerated	in	the	first	
eight	Amendments,	but	because	they	are	of	such	a	nature	that	they	are	
included	 in	 the	 ‘conception	 of	 due	 process	 of	 law.’”43	 In	 weighing	
whether	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 protected	 from	 state	 action	
rights	enumerated	in	the	Fifth	and	Sixth	Amendments,	the	Court	asked	
whether	such	a	right	constituted	one	of	the	“fundamental	principles	of	
liberty	and	 justice	which	 lie	at	 the	base	of	all	our	civil	and	political	
institutions.”44	
But	starting	in	1961,	the	Warren	Court	moved	toward	a	right-by-
right	 “selective	 incorporation”	 approach	 to	 criminal	 procedural	
protections,45	 ultimately	 incorporating	 through	 the	 Fourteenth	







	 41.	 Id.	at	273.	 	
	 42.	 287	U.S.	45,	71	(1932).	
	 43.	 Id.	at	67–68	(quoting	Twining	v.	New	Jersey,	211	U.S.	78,	99	(1908));	ERWIN	








seized.”);	 Israel,	 supra	 note	 40,	 at	 253	 (“In	 June	 1960	 Justice	 Brennan’s	 separate	
opinion	in	Ohio	ex	rel.	Eaton	v.	Price	set	forth	what	came	to	be	the	doctrinal	foundation	
of	the	Warren	Court’s	criminal	procedure	revolution	.	.	.	[and]	what	is	now	commonly	




day.46	 Such	 abandonment	 of	 the	 fundamental	 fairness	 approach	 is	
widely	 recognized	 as	 “one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 legacies	 of	 the	
Warren	 Court.	.	.	.”47	 In	 opting	 for	 selective	 incorporation,	 the	






and	 freedom	 from	unreasonable	 searches	 and	 seizures53	 under	 the	
Fourth	Amendment;	 the	Double	Jeopardy	Clause,54	privilege	against	
self-incrimination,55	and	Just	Compensation	Clause56	under	the	Fifth	
Amendment;	 the	 rights	 to	 trial	 by	 jury,57	 compulsory	 process,58	
speedy	trial,59	confrontation	of	adverse	witnesses,60	and	assistance	of	
counsel61	under	the	Sixth	Amendment;	and	the	prohibitions	against	
cruel	 and	 unusual	 punishment,62	 excessive	 bail,63	 and	 excessive	
fines64	 under	 the	 Eighth	 Amendment.	 At	 time	 of	 writing,	 the	 only	




































criminal	 procedural	 line	 drawing.	 The	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	
incorporation	debates	among	the	members	of	the	U.S.	Supreme	Court	
illustrate	the	slippery	nature	of	this	inquiry.	For	example,	in	Duncan	v.	
Louisiana,	 Justices	White	 and	Harlan,	 purporting	 to	 apply	 the	 same	
standard,	disagreed	as	to	whether	it	was	“fundamentally	unfair”	for	
the	state	of	Louisiana	to	withhold	from	Gary	Duncan	the	right	to	a	jury	





Second,	 incorporation	 reveals	 the	 three	 options	 available	 to	
courts	when	evaluating	the	criminal	procedures	of	other	sovereigns.	
One	 is	 a	 “hands	 off”	 approach,	 permitting	 the	 other	 sovereign	
discretion	to	guarantee	whichever	criminal	procedural	rights	it	deems	
to	be	fundamental.	The	opposite	extreme	is	a	total	incorporation,	or	
“normalization”	 approach,	 calling	 for	 criminal	 procedure	 to	 be	 co-
extensive	with	that	of	the	U.S.	Bill	of	Rights	and	related	rights	flowing	
from	 them.	 The	 middle	 option—between	 rigorous	 insistence	 on	
identical	procedural	guarantees	and	laissez-faire	permissibility	of	all	
foreign	 procedure—consists	 of	 two	 other	 possibilities.	 Courts	 can	
selectively	 incorporate	 a	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 by	 guaranteeing	
only	 certain	 rights,	 rooted	 in	notions	 of	 fundamental	 guarantees	 in	
Anglo-American	jurisprudence.	Or,	courts	may	apply	a	more	nebulous	



















Finally,	 the	 long	 history	 of	 incorporation	 has	 given	 room	 to	
understand	 the	 positives	 and	 negatives	 of	 a	 fundamental	 rights	
approach	 to	 criminal	 procedure.	 For	 example,	 William	 Stuntz	 has	
famously	 critiqued	 the	 Warren	 Court’s	 procedural	 revolution	 as	











Core	 criminal	 procedure	 also	 animates	 U.S.	 engagement	 with	




Political	 Rights	 (ICCPR).72	 In	 contrast	 to	 judicial	 right-by-right	













	 72.	 Zachary	 Elkins,	 Tom	 Ginsburg	 &	 Beth	 Simmons,	 Getting	 to	 Rights:	 Treaty	
Ratification,	Constitutional	Convergence,	and	Human	Rights	Practice,	54	HARV.	L.	REV.	
61,	 65–66	 (2013)	 (noting	 the	 process	 of	 countries	 agreeing	 on	 certain	 rights,	 in	
particular	criminal	procedural	rights,	when	drafting	the	UDHR).	
	 73.	 See	generally	SAMUEL	MOYN,	THE	LAST	UTOPIA:	HUMAN	RIGHTS	IN	HISTORY	62–72	
(2010)	 (reviewing	 the	 history	 of	 the	 UDHR	 negotiation	 and	 highlighting	 the	 cross-
cultural	complexities	in	doing	so).	






political	 rights	 as	 opposed	 to	 economic	 security	 rights;75	 so	 while	
there	was	some	discussion	of	certain	freedoms	relevant	to	Franklin	D.	
Roosevelt’s	 “four	 freedoms”	speech	 from	1941,76	 the	delegation	did	
little	 preparatory	work	 to	define	human	 rights	 in	 a	 broader,	 cross-
cultural	sense.77	
However,	disagreements	with	foreign	nations	as	to	the	substance	
and	 language	 of	 such	 rights	 led	 the	 United	 States	 and	 other	
participating	nations	to	conclude	that	a	separate	bill	of	rights	should	
be	 drafted	 and	 negotiated	 in	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	U.N.	 Charter	
itself	was	adopted,	leaving	the	Charter	with	only	a	brief	reference	to	
human	 rights.78	 When	 the	 time	 came	 to	 negotiate	 the	 Declaration	
itself,	the	various	parties	aimed	to	articulate	“a	common	conception	of	
human	 rights	 that	 would	 command	 acceptance	 despite	 huge	
differences	 in	 culture,	 political	 systems,	 geographic	 location	 and	
economic	 circumstance.”79	 Negotiations	 ultimately	 turned	 on	 a	
variety	of	tensions,	including	natural	law	versus	positivism,	liberalism	
versus	 Marxism,	 and	 western	 perspectives	 versus	 non-western	
perspectives.80	
With	 regard	 to	 criminal	 procedure,	 an	 initial	 question	 of	 the	
UDHR	drafting	process	was	which	rights	to	even	include.81	Designed	
precisely	to	strengthen	the	independence	of	the	judiciary,	Articles	6–




	 75.	 See	 id.	 at	 40–42	 (describing	 the	 clash	 of	 values	 and	 particularly	 the	
assumptions	of	the	American	Law	Institute	on	foundational	rights).	




	 77.	 Even	the	American	Law	Institute,	which	 in	1942	appointed	a	committee	of	
lawyers	and	political	 scientists	 from	several	different	 countries	 including	Germany,	
Poland,	 India,	and	Lebanon,	was	unable	 to	 reach	complete	consensus	regarding	 the	














of	 the	 U.S.	 Bill	 of	 Rights	 but	 affirming	 general	 principles	 that	 are	
immanent	 in	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution.	 In	 particular,	 Articles	 6–12	
guarantee	universal	recognition	as	a	person	and	equality	before	the	
law,83	effective	judicial	remedy	for	violation	of	fundamental	rights,84	
freedom	from	arbitrary	arrest	or	detention,85	 “full	equality	 to	a	 fair	
and	 public	 hearing	 by	 an	 independent	 and	 impartial	 tribunal,”86	
presumption	 of	 innocence,87	 protection	 against	 retroactivity,88	 and	
protection	against	“arbitrary	 interference”	with	a	person’s	“privacy,	







made	 proposals	 to	 expand	 the	 protections	 guaranteed	 by	 these	
articles.	 For	 example,	 the	 United	 States	 proposed	 that	 the	 UDHR	
include	the	right	of	arrestees	to	“be	promptly	informed	of	the	charges	
against	 [them],	 and	 to	 trial	 within	 a	 reasonable	 time	 or	 to	 be	
released,”91	 but	 the	 provision’s	 final	 form	 guarantees	 protection	
against	merely	 “arbitrary	arrest,	detention,	or	exile.”92	Additionally,	
the	 United	 States	 proposed	 adding	 the	 rights	 of	 confrontation	 and	
counsel,93	but	the	final	language	of	the	provision	only	guarantees	“a	
fair	and	public	hearing	by	an	independent	and	impartial	tribunal.”94	
Criminal	 procedural	 line	 drawing	 was	 not	 only	 evident	 in	 the	


















	 95.	 Given	 its	 status	 as	 a	 declaration,	 the	 UDHR	 is	 not	 a	 human	 rights	 treaty,	





equality	 before	 courts	 and	 tribunals,	 presumption	 of	 innocence,	






stated	 its	 understanding	 that	 the	 guarantee	 of	 “legal	 assistance	 of	
[one’s]	 choosing”99	 does	 not	 require	 the	 provision	 of	 a	 criminal	








States	 reserved	 its	 acceptance	 of	 a	 separate	 criminal	 procedural	
standard	for	juveniles	as	compared	with	adults,	maintaining	that,	in	






S.	 EXEC.	DOC.	NO.	 E,	 95-2,	 999	 U.N.T.S.	 171	 [hereinafter	 ICCPR];	 Hum.	 Rts.	 Comm.,	
General	Comment	No.	32:	Article	14:	Right	to	Equality	Before	Courts	and	Tribunals	and	




















edge.	 The	 U.S.	 government	 has	 recently	 articulated	 core	 criminal	
procedure	in	statutory	rules	governing	the	transmission	of	in-country	
electronic	data	abroad	for	use	in	foreign	criminal	cases.	The	Clarifying	
Lawful	Overseas	Use	of	Data	 (CLOUD)	Act,	 enacted	 in	2018,	 is	best	
known	for	amending	the	Stored	Communications	Act	to	allow	U.S.	law	
enforcement	 to	compel	 internet	service	providers	 (ISPs)	 to	provide	
data	 stored	 on	 servers	 abroad.105	 However,	 it	 also	 empowers	 the	
executive	 branch	 to	 enter	 bilateral	 agreements	 with	 foreign	
governments,	which	may	then	directly	request	electronic	data	 from	
U.S.	ISPs	and	use	that	data	as	evidence	in	a	foreign	prosecution.106	In	
many	 cases,	 this	 obviates	 the	 need	 for	 mutual	 legal	 assistance,	
increasing	efficiency	in	law	enforcement	cooperation.107	
Notably,	 the	Act	mandates	 that	 the	Attorney	General,	with	 the	
concurrence	 of	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State,	 certify	 to	 Congress	 its	









has	 been	 rendered	 by	 a	 court	 of	 the	 same	 governmental	 unit,	 whether	 the	 federal	
government	 or	 a	 constituent	 unit.	 See	 id.	 at	 1200.	 Finally,	 of	 the	 seven	 major	
international	human	 rights	 treaties,	 the	only	other	 to	 touch	on	 criminal	procedural	
guarantees	is	the	U.N.	Convention	against	Torture,	which	includes	provisions	that	bear	
on	 criminal	 procedural	 rights.	 See	 UNFPA,	 Core	 International	 Human	 Rights	
Instruments,	 UNITED	 NATIONS	 POPULATION	 FUND	 (2004),	 https://www.unfpa.org/	
resources/core-international-human-rights-instruments	 [https://perma.cc/SV4H	
-VZMS];	 Convention	 Against	 Torture	 and	 Other	 Cruel,	 Inhuman	 or	 Degrading	
Treatment	or	Punishment	art.	3,	Feb.	4,	1985,	S.	TREATY	DOC.	NO.	100-20,	1465	U.N.T.S.	
85	[hereinafter	CAT].	











liberties.”108	 The	 Act	 provides	 both	 procedural	 and	 substantive	
guidance	 as	 to	 how	 the	 executive	 branch	 should	 make	 that	
determination,	mandating	that	it	consider	factors	such	as	“adequate	
substantive	 and	 procedural	 laws	 on	 cybercrime	 and	 electronic	
evidence,”109	 respect	 for	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 nondiscrimination	
principles,	and	applicable	human	rights	standards.110	Regarding	the	
latter,	the	Act	specifies	rights	such	as	“protection	from	arbitrary	and	
unlawful	 interference	with	 privacy;”	 “fair	 trial	 rights;”	 “freedom	 of	
expression,	 association,	 and	 peaceful	 assembly;”	 “prohibitions	 on	
arbitrary	arrest	and	detention;”	and	“prohibitions	against	torture	and	
cruel,	 inhuman,	 or	 degrading	 treatment	 or	 punishment.”111	 It	 also	
categorically	 exempts	 such	 certifications	 and	 determinations	 from	
judicial	review.112	
In	 summary,	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach	 explicitly	
guarantees	certain	fundamental	rights.	In	the	incorporation	context,	
core	criminal	procedure	encompasses	virtually	all	U.S.	Bill	of	Rights	
guarantees,	 save	 for	 the	 Fifth	 Amendment	 right	 to	 indictment	 by	
grand	 jury	 and	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 right	 to	 a	 jury	 selected	 from	












	 111.	 Id.	§	2523(b)(1)(B)(iii).	The	Act	also	specifies	certain	requirements	 for	 the	








tested	 in	 the	 courts	 nor	 discussed	 in	 depth	 in	 academic	 literature.	 This	will	 surely	
change	 soon,	 however.	 In	 October	 2019,	 the	 United	 States	 and	 United	 Kingdom	
concluded	the	first	bilateral	agreement	under	the	Act,	paving	the	way	for	each	country	








While	 core	 criminal	 procedure,	 in	 the	 contexts	 above,	 is	
enumerated,	prospective,	and	relatively	coherent	 in	 its	approach	 to	
fundamental	 rights,	 the	 outlier	 approach	 described	 in	 this	 Part	 is	
imprecise,	retrospective,	and	ad	hoc.	Pursuant	to	this	approach,	in	all	
but	the	most	flagrant	cases	of	foreign	criminal	justice	system	abuse,	




The	 outlier	 approach	 manifests	 itself,	 first,	 when	 foreign	 law	
enforcement	 investigators	 produce	 evidence	 that	 U.S.	 prosecutors	
move	to	admit	in	U.S.	criminal	proceedings.		
This	issue	presents	itself	with	increasing	frequency	today,	but	its	
roots	 are	 of	 old	 vintage.115	 While	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	 is	 silent	
regarding	its	territorial	reach,	the	Insular	Cases	of	1901	distinguished	
between	 incorporated	 and	 unincorporated	 territories	 as	 respective	
zones	 in	which	 “fundamental”	 and	 “nonfundamental”	 constitutional	
limitations	applied,	respectively.116	From	this	point	until	 the	1950s,	
constitutional	 rights	 “follow[ed]	 the	 flag”—i.e.,	 to	 newly-acquired	
territories—but	nowhere	else.117	And	while	 the	plurality	opinion	 in	
the	1957	case	Reid	v.	Covert	reasoned	that	Bill	of	Rights	protections	
should	 apply	 to	 U.S.	 citizens	 everywhere,118	 Justice	 Kennedy’s	
approach,	 first	 articulated	 in	 his	 concurrence	 in	 United	 States	 v.	
Verdugo-Urquidez	 (1990)	 and	 later	 in	 his	 majority	 opinion	 in	
Boumediene	v.	Bush	(2008),	held	that	the	Constitution	does	not	apply	
abroad—at	least	with	regard	to	foreign	nationals—when	it	would	be	
“impracticable	and	anomalous.”119	The	 issue	 in	many	of	 these	cases	










	 119.	 Boumediene	 v.	 Bush,	 553	 U.S.	 723,	 759	 (2008)	 (citing	 United	 States	 v.	
Verdugo-Urquidez,	494	U.S.	259,	277–78	(1990)	 (Kennedy,	 J.,	 concurring));	see	also	
Neuman,	supra	note	116,	at	375	(“We	may	assume,	however,	that	U.S.	citizens	retain	





the	 American	 empire,	 i.e.,	 to	 the	 United	 States	 acting	 as	 sovereign,	
albeit	 outside	 of	 core	 U.S.	 territory.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 central	
question	 in	 such	 cases	 was	 whether	 the	 Constitution	 protected	
Americans	that	 the	U.S.	government	tried	overseas.120	A	related	but	
distinct	 line	 of	 cases	 concerns	 U.S.	 courts	 evaluating	 foreign	
sovereigns	 applying	 the	 outlier	 approach	 to	 the	 fruits	 of	
extraterritorial	 searches,	 statements	 obtained	 during	 foreign	
custodial	interrogation,	and	other	areas	wherein	foreign	evidence	is	
introduced	in	domestic	criminal	proceedings.121		
This	 foreign	 sovereign	 evaluation	 plays	 out	 in	 two	 different	
doctrinal	scenarios.	First,	there	are	the	cases	on	the	applicability	of	the	
U.S.	 Constitution	 abroad,	 wherein	 courts	 engage	 in	 complex	 line	




anomalous.”122	 Under	 this	 aforementioned	 test,	 constitutional	
protections	 will	 turn	 on	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	 “practical	 concerns”	
involved	 in	 applying	 the	 rights,123	 rather	 than	 on	 straightforward	
application	of	constitutional	principles	and	precedent,	as	would	be	the	
case	in	ordinary	domestic	prosecutions.124	The	courts	have	similarly	
created	 tests	 to	 determine	 who	 benefits	 from	 constitutional	
protections.	Under	the	prevailing	view	articulated	in	Boumediene,	the	
extraterritorial	 rights	 of	 both	 citizens	 and	 noncitizens	 vary	 from	






(2002)	 (examining	 the	 historical	 origins	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 “inherent	 powers”	 over	
foreign	affairs	and	the	Supreme	Court’s	ultimate	ratification	of	that	doctrine	in	its	late-
nineteenth-century	decisions	concerning	Indians,	aliens,	and	territories).	
	 121.	 See,	 e.g.,	United	States	v.	Emmanuel,	565	F.3d	1324,	1330	 (11th	Cir.	2009)	
(“The	 general	 rule	 is	 that	 evidence	 obtained	 from	 searches	 carried	 out	 by	 foreign	
officials	in	their	own	countries	is	admissible	in	United	States	courts,	even	if	the	search	







	 124.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Terry	 v.	 Ohio,	 392	 U.S.	 1,	 20–30	 (1968)	 (applying	 constitutional	
principles	and	precedent	to	determine	the	reasonableness	of	search	and	seizure).	




non-citizens,	 the	 courts	 have	 sometimes	 determined	 that	 whether	
they	benefit	from	constitutional	protections	in	U.S.	courts	depends	on	
the	extent	of	their	“voluntary	connection[s]”	to	the	United	States.126	
Even	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 Constitution	 does	 not	 apply	 abroad,	
courts	 may	 still	 exclude	 evidence	 using	 the	 outlier	 approach.	 The	
Fourth	Amendment	is	the	prime	example	here.	Generally,	U.S.	courts	
will	admit	evidence	that	foreign	officials	obtain	from	a	search	in	their	
own	 country,	 even	 when	 such	 search	 would	 not	 comply	 with	 U.S.	
law.127	 But	 when	 foreign	 law	 enforcement	 is	 operating	 entirely	




“supervisory	 powers	 over	 the	 administration	 of	 federal	 justice,”129	
and	 protects	 against	 foreign	 government	 conduct	 that	 “violates	









Verdugo-Urquidez,	 494	 U.S.	 at	 274	 (adding	 the	 requirement	 that	 the	 Fourth	





reasonableness	 of	 foreign	 search),	with	 Emmanuel,	 565	 F.3d	 at	 1330	 (holding	 that	
evidence	obtained	from	searches	by	foreign	officials	is	generally	admissible,	even	if	the	
search	 violated	 foreign	 law),	 United	 States	 v.	Morrow,	 537	 F.2d	 120,	 140	 (5th	 Cir.	
1976)	(refusing	to	hold	that	the	Government	must	demonstrate	that	a	search	was	legal	












	 130.	 United	 States	 v.	 Mitro,	 880	 F.2d	 1480,	 1483–84	 (1st	 Cir.	 1989)	 (quoting	




“high	 bar.”131	 For	 instance,	 the	 Second	 Circuit	 has	 affirmed	 the	
admission	 of	 evidence	 that	may	 have	 been	 obtained	 by	 Israeli	 law	
enforcement	without	 a	warrant	 under	 Israeli	 law.132	 Or	 as	 another	
example,	the	Eleventh	Circuit	has	found	that	lack	of	Bahamian	judicial	
review	 by	 a	 neutral	 magistrate	 over	 wiretaps	 did	 not	 shock	 the	
conscience,	given	that	fundamental	international	norms	of	decency	do	
not	 require	 in	 all	 jurisdictions	 such	 review	 over	 applications	 to	
intercept	wire	communications.133	
Fifth	 Amendment	 interrogation	 jurisprudence	 similarly	
exemplifies	 the	 outlier	 approach.	 Interrogation	 abroad	 by	 foreign	
authorities	 does	 not	 require	 Miranda	 warnings,	 given	 that	 the	
Constitution	 cannot	 compel	 such	 foreign	 law	 enforcement	 conduct	
and,	 furthermore,	 U.S.	 court	 exclusion	 has	 little	 deterrent	 effect	 on	
foreign	police	practices.134	 But	 if	 the	U.S.	 government	 subsequently	
moves	to	admit	such	statements	into	evidence	in	a	domestic	criminal	
case,	 it	must	demonstrate	 that	such	statements	were	voluntary	and	
that	 the	methods	 for	 obtaining	 such	 statements	 did	 not	 “shock	 the	
conscience.”135	This	“shocks	the	conscience”	test	derives	from	the	Due	
Process	 Clauses	 of	 the	 Fifth	 and	 Fourteenth	 Amendments,136	 and	




















whether	 the	 evidence	 is	 sought	 to	 be	 used	 in	 a	 criminal	 trial,	 a	 Fifth	 Amendment	
violation	may	occur	only	if	a	statement	is	introduced	at	trial);	Casey	v.	Dep’t	of	State,	









apply.137	 For	 example,	 the	 Eleventh	 Circuit	 has	 found	 voluntary	 a	
statement	 that	 Cambodian	 law	 enforcement	 elicited	 when	 the	
defendant	was	interrogated	for	less	than	two	hours,	was	offered	food	
and	 water,	 was	 not	 beaten	 or	 threatened,	 and	 was	 “treated	 with	
respect.”138	Similarly,	the	Southern	District	of	New	York	has	found	that	
a	statement	given	 to	Colombian	 law	enforcement	did	not	shock	 the	
conscience	when	the	defendant	was	first	advised	of	his	rights	under	





These	 tests	 are	ad	hoc,	 fact-specific,	 and	 at	 times	 criticized.	As	
some	 scholars	 have	 noted,	 the	 meaning	 of	 “impracticable	 and	
anomalous”	 is	 unclear.140	 The	 U.S.	 District	 Court	 for	 the	 District	 of	
Columbia	 has	 noted	 that	 “neither	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 nor	 the	 D.C.	
Circuit	has	articulated	a	 clear	 test	 .	.	.	 to	 evaluate	whether	 [foreign]	
government	 conduct	 shocks	 the	 conscience”	 in	 the	 Fourth	
Amendment	context.141	And	some	judges	have	criticized	this	approach	
on	 the	 ground	 that	 it	 opens	 U.S.	 nationals	 up	 to	 the	 “vagaries”	 of	
foreign	criminal	justice	systems.142	
2.	 Judgments	Material	to	Sentencing	











	 142.	 See,	 e.g.,	 United	 States	 v.	 Barona,	 56	 F.3d	 1087,	 1100	 (9th	 Cir.	 1995)	
(Reinhardt,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (“[W]hat	 the	 majority	 holds	 is	 that	 the	 only	 Fourth	
Amendment	protections	United	States	citizens	who	travel	abroad	enjoy	vis-a-vis	the	
United	 States	 government	 are	 those	 safeguards,	 if	 any,	 afforded	 by	 the	 laws	 of	 the	
foreign	nations	they	visit.”).	In	Barona,	the	majority	affirmed	the	admission	of	evidence	
obtained	in	Denmark	through	a	joint	venture	between	Danish	and	U.S.	authorities	as	
reasonable	 on	 the	basis	 that	 all	 authorities	 fully	 complied	with	Danish	 law	 in	 their	
investigation.	Id.	at	1096.	
	 143.	 A	 departure	 allows	 sentencing	 courts	 to	 impose	 sentences	 outside	 or	
otherwise	 different	 from	 the	 Commission’s	 guideline	 range,	 or—if	 the	 departure	 is	
based	on	inadequate	criminal	history—to	assign	a	different	criminal	history	category,	
allowing	 the	 court	 to	 impose	 a	 sentence	 outside	 the	 guideline	 range.	 OFF.	 OF	GEN.	
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At	 the	 federal	 level,	 although	 the	 U.S.	 Sentencing	 Guidelines	
specify	that	foreign	convictions	may	not	be	taken	into	account	when	
computing	a	defendant’s	criminal	history,	they	expressly	provide	that	
such	 convictions	 may	 be	 considered	 at	 sentencing	 “[i]f	 reliable	
information	indicates	that	the	defendant’s	criminal	history	category	
substantially	 under-represents	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 defendant’s	
criminal	history	or	the	likelihood	that	the	defendant	will	commit	other	
crimes.”144	Among	the	states,	considerable	differences	exist	regarding	
the	extent	 to	which	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments	may	be	 recognized,	
particularly	in	the	context	of	repeat	offender	statutes.145	Some	state	
courts	 have	 insisted	 that	 prosecutors	 demonstrate	 that	 the	 foreign	
legal	 system	 in	 which	 a	 defendant	 was	 previously	 convicted	 is	
“fundamentally	fair,”146	but	most	have	been	willing	to	consider	foreign	




to	 such	 upward	 departure.	 The	 variation	 in	 the	 case	 law	 is	 how	
specifically	 courts	 consider	 criminal	 procedural	 guarantees	 when	
doing	 so.	 Some	 courts,	 in	 addressing	 the	 use	 of	 foreign	 criminal	
convictions	 at	 sentencing,	 have	 rejected	 challenges	 to	 upward	
departure	 without	 addressing	 any	 specific	 procedural	 rights.148	 In	
 
COUNS.,	 U.S.	 SENT’G	 COMM’N,	 DEPARTURE	 AND	 VARIANCE	 PRIMER	 1,	 5	 (2014),	 https://	
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/training/primers/2014_Primer_Departure_Va
riance.pdf	[https://perma.cc/3C5P-ABL8].	




may	 be	 considered	 under	 §	4A1.3	 (Departures	 Based	 on	 Inadequacy	 of	 Criminal	
History	Category	(Policy	Statement)).”).	
	 145.	 As	 of	 1994,	 eight	 states	 expressly	 allowed	 for	 the	 consideration	 of	 foreign	
judgments,	 twenty	 states	 disallowed	 it,	 and	 the	 remaining	 states	 had	 not	 clearly	
decided	 the	 issue.	 See	 Alex	 Glashausser,	 Note,	 The	 Treatment	 of	 Foreign	 Country	
Convictions	as	Predicates	for	Sentence	Enhancement	Under	Recidivist	Statutes,	44	DUKE	
L.J.	134,	139	(1994).	
	 146.	 See,	 e.g.,	 People	 v.	 Wallach,	 312	 N.W.2d	 387,	 404	 (Mich.	 Ct.	 App.	 1981)	

















convictions	 in	 its	upward	departure	at	sentencing,	 sidestepping	 the	
defendant’s	claims	that	such	courts	lack	due	process	and	procedural	
rights.149	 The	 district	 court	 found	 that,	 although	 such	 proceedings	
“lacked	 certain	 rights”	 guaranteed	 domestically,	 expert	 testimony	
regarding	 the	 various	 procedural	 protections	 that	 were	 in	 place	














Cir.	 1989)	 (affirming	 upward	 departure	 based	 on	 defendant’s	 previous	 Italian	
conviction	 because	 trial	 judge	 was	 fully	 apprised	 of	 the	 “possible	 constitutional	
infirmities”	of	the	foreign	judgment);	see	also	Brice	v.	Pickett,	515	F.2d	153,	154	(9th	
Cir.	 1975)	 (“Even	 if	 .	.	.	 [defendant]	 could	 prove	 that	 the	 foreign	 conviction	 was	







355,	381	(noting	gacaca	 courts’	 lack	of	competent	 judges,	prosecutors,	and	defense	
counsel).	
	 151.	 See	 HUM.	 RTS.	 WATCH,	 JUSTICE	 COMPROMISED:	 THE	 LEGACY	 OF	 RWANDA’S	
COMMUNITY-BASED	 GACACA	 COURTS	 27–65	 (2011)	 (reviewing	 gacaca	 procedure	 and	
arguable	 violations	 of	 the	 right	 to	 counsel,	 presumption	 of	 innocence,	 right	 to	 be	
informed	of	the	case	and	to	have	time	to	prepare	a	defense,	right	to	present	a	defense,	




	 153.	 See,	 e.g.,	United	States	v.	Wilson,	556	F.2d	1177,	1178	 (4th	Cir.	1977)	 (per	
curiam)	 (“The	 only	 question	 here	 is	 whether	 the	 German	 legal	 system	 is	 so	
fundamentally	 unfair	 that	 a	 conviction	 obtained	 under	 it	 is	 inadmissible.	 The	
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noted	 above,	 the	 “fundamental	 fairness”	 inquiry—by	 which	 courts	
evaluate	whether	a	given	criminal	procedural	rule	is	consistent	with	
due	 process—typically	 proceeds	 by	 considering	whether	 the	 given	
right	 is	 contrary	 to	 “a	 fundamental	 principle	 of	 liberty	 and	 justice	
which	 inheres	 in	 the	 very	 idea	 of	 a	 free	 government	 and	 is	 the	
inalienable	right	of	a	citizen	of	such	a	government.”154	For	example,	in	
United	 States	 v.	 Kole,	 the	 Third	 Circuit	 held	 that	 a	 prior	 Philippine	
conviction	in	which	the	defendant	was	denied	the	right	to	a	jury	trial	
was	 nonetheless	 consistent	 with	 fundamental	 fairness,	 as	 the	
Philippine	court’s	 judgment	reflected	“the	kind	of	careful,	searching	
analysis	of	evidence	that	one	would	expect	.	.	.	in	the	United	States.”155	
Applying	 the	 “fundamental	 fairness”	 standard	 derived	 from	 the	
Fourteenth	Amendment’s	Due	Process	Clause,	 courts	have	 typically	















nation	 .	.	.	 [was	 compatible]	 with	 our	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 fairness”).	 But	 see	








The	 court	 considered	 the	 investigative	 report	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Military	 Police,	
which	 was	 accompanied	 by	 extensive	 documentation	 .	.	.	.”	 (internal	 quotations	
omitted));	 see	 also	 United	 States	 v.	 Ngombwa,	 No.	 14-CR-123-LRR,	 2017	 U.S.	 Dist.	
LEXIS	17373,	at	*66	(N.D.	Iowa	Feb.	7,	2017)	(“[T]he	court	finds	that	the	eyewitness	
reports	of	Defendant’s	acts	of	violence—bolstered	by	his	convictions	in	two	separate	
[Rwandan]	 courts—constitute	 ‘reliable	 information’	 indicating	 that	 Defendant’s	
classification	 in	 Criminal	 History	 Category	 I	 under-represents	 the	 severity	 of	 his	
criminal	history.”);	United	States	v.	Small,	183	F.	Supp.	2d	755,	769	(W.D.	Pa.	2002),	
aff’d,	333	F.3d	425	(2003),	rev’d,	544	U.S.	385	(2005)	(“Although	[violating	defendant’s	





convictions	 obtained	 without	 assistance	 of	 counsel,158	 convictions	




is	 at	 its	 apex.	 In	 this	 context,	 courts	 advance	 an	 outlier	 test	 when	
evaluating	foreign	criminal	justice	systems,	due	in	part	to	antecedent	
political	branch	action.	
The	 political	 branches	 are	 the	 first	 to	 engage	 in	 criminal	
procedural	 line	 drawing	 when	 they	 negotiate	 bilateral	 extradition	
treaties.	Under	Title	18	of	the	U.S.	Code,	such	a	treaty	is	necessary	to	
extradite	 a	 person	 out	 of	 the	 United	 States.161	 The	 U.S.	 political	
branches	have	thus	concluded	such	bilateral	extradition	treaties	with	
dozens	 of	 other	 countries.162	 In	 so	 doing,	 they	 act	 as	 criminal	
procedural	 gatekeepers,	 assessing	 other	 countries’	 criminal	 justice	




What	 exactly	 do	 the	 political	 branches	 assess	 in	 a	 potential	
extradition	 treaty	 partner?	Unfortunately,	 public	 statements	 in	 this	
regard	are	quite	sparse.	To	be	sure,	the	branches	do	not	require	the	
identical,	 finely-tuned	 constellation	 of	 U.S.	 rights.	 The	 majority	 of	
treaty	 partners	 are	 civil	 law	 countries,	 meaning	 they	 are	 non-








	 161.	 See	 18	 U.S.C.	 §	 3181(a)	 (“The	 provisions	 of	 this	 chapter	 relating	 to	 the	
surrender	of	persons	who	have	committed	crimes	in	foreign	countries	shall	continue	


















outset	 of	 criminal	 proceedings.168	 Even	 after	 conclusion	 of	 the	
extradition	 treaty,	 executive	 branch	 extradition	 practice	 also	
demonstrates	some	critical	evaluation	of	foreign	criminal	procedure.	
For	 example,	 many	 civil	 law	 countries	 convict	 in	 absentia,	 i.e.,	 in	
instances	 where	 a	 criminal	 defendant	 is	 at	 large	 and	 thus	 not	
physically	 present	 at	 trial.169	 For	 the	 U.S.	 executive	 branch,	 such	 a	
conviction	is	a	step	too	far:	if	a	foreign	country	convicts	a	defendant	in	
absentia	and	such	defendant	is	located	in	U.S.	territory,	the	executive	






	 165.	 See	generally	Valerie	P.	Hans,	 Jury	Systems	Around	the	World,	4	ANN.	REV.	L.	
SOC.	SCI.	275	(2008)	(surveying	the	various	forms	of	jury	trial	worldwide).	

































discretion	not	 to	 issue	 a	 surrender	warrant	 in	 instances	where	 the	
fugitive	 has	 shown	 that	 he	 or	 she	would	 be	 tortured	 or	 otherwise	
denied	 the	 requisite	 process	 abroad.173	 Whether	 explicitly	 or	 not,	
courts	assume	that	they	are	“bound	by	the	existence	of	an	extradition	
treaty	 to	 assume	 that	 the	 trial	 will	 be	 fair.”174	 On	 occasion,	 the	
judiciary	has	 recognized	 a	 limit	 to	 this	 deference.	 For	 example,	 the	
Second	 Circuit	 has	 expressed	 “disquiet”	 over	 this	 doctrine,	
recognizing	 possible	 “situations	 where	 [an	 extraditee]	 would	 be	





despite	 petitioner’s	 claims	 that	 he	 would	 be	 tortured	 if	 extradited	 because	 “such	






above,	 such	 deference	 also	 implicates	 foreign	 substantive	 criminal	 law.	 Individuals	
may	also	be	extradited	to	other	countries	and	prosecuted	for	crimes	that	would	not	
constitute	criminal	conduct	within	the	United	States.	In	re	Extradition	of	Demjanjuk,	
612	 F.	 Supp.	 544,	 569	 (N.D.	 Ohio	 1985)	 (“If	 the	 extradition	 treaty	 so	 provides,	 the	
United	States	may	surrender	a	person	to	be	prosecuted	for	acts	which	are	not	crimes	
in	 the	 United	 States.”);	 Factor	 v.	 Laubenheimer,	 290	 U.S.	 276,	 293	 (1933)	









at	 the	 rule	 of	 non-inquiry	 have	 since	 been	 overruled.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Cornejo-Barreto	 v.	
Seifert,	 218	 F.3d	 1004,	 1007	 (9th	 Cir.	 2000)	 (concluding	 that	 an	 individual	 facing	
extradition	who	claims	he	will	be	subjected	to	torture	in	the	requesting	country	may,	









Judicial	 reticence	 in	 this	 area	may	 stem	 from	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
United	States’	duties	to	its	own	nationals	in	extraditions	are	unclear,	
falling	 between	 the	 twin	 doctrinal	 pillars	 of	 domestic	 criminal	
procedural	 violations	 and	 extradition	 prohibitions	 in	 cases	 of	
torture.177	 On	 one	 hand,	 any	 such	 foreign	 criminal	 process	 would	
clearly	violate	constitutionally	guaranteed	procedural	rights	were	it	
to	apply	in	a	domestic	U.S.	case.178	On	the	other	hand,	the	United	States	
has	 an	 absolute	 obligation	 not	 to	 extradite	 individuals	 to	 countries	
where	 they	 will	 be	 tortured.	 The	 principle	 of	 non-refoulement	
prohibits	the	expulsion	of	a	refugee	to	a	country	where	she	may	be	
persecuted.179		







its	 decision	 to	 extradite	 if	 such	 conduct	 violates	 constitutional	 rights.”),	 partially	
overruled	by	Venckiene	v.	United	States,	929	F.3d	843,	860	(7th	Cir.	2019).	
	 177.	 To	 be	 clear,	 the	 preceding	 discussion	 should	 not	 be	 misunderstood	 as	
suggesting	that	the	executive	branch	enjoys	unfettered	discretion	to	extradite	at	will.	




establish	 probable	 cause	 that	 the	 fugitive	 committed	 the	 offenses	 underlying	 the	
request	for	extradition.”).	But	before	any	such	case	reaches	such	judicial	review,	the	
political	branches	must	have	concluded	a	bilateral	extradition	treaty	with	the	foreign	
country.	 See	 18	 U.S.C.	 §	 3181(a)	 (“The	 provisions	 of	 this	 chapter	 relating	 to	 the	
surrender	of	persons	who	have	committed	crimes	in	foreign	countries	shall	continue	









	 179.	 The	 United	 States	 has,	 at	 times,	 nonetheless	 done	 so,	 depending	 upon	
diplomatic	assurances	before	transferring	 individuals	 to	countries	where	they	were	
likely	to	be	tortured.	Jonathan	Horowitz,	Fatally	Flawed	Anti-Torture	Assurances,	JUST	
SEC.	 (June	 13,	 2017),	 https://www.justsecurity.org/42009/fatally-flawed-anti	
-torture-assurances	[https://perma.cc/FL83-MXVF].	
	 180.	 CAT,	 supra	 note	 104,	 at	 114;	 see	 The	 Principle	 of	 Non-Refoulment	 Under	





States	 will	 not	 deport	 someone	 to	 a	 country	 where	 she	 will	 be	
tortured,	 even	 giving	 that	 person	 asylum	 in	 certain	 cases.181	 These	
cases	 lie	 in	 the	middle:	 state	 action	 clearly	 exists	 because	 the	 U.S.	




Finally,	 U.S.	 courts	 differ	 regarding	 the	 weight	 to	 be	 given	 to	
foreign	convictions	in	absentia	when	determining	whether	a	foreign	
state	has	demonstrated	probable	cause	to	arrest	an	individual	within	








G.	 Johnston,	 The	 Risk	 of	 Torture	 as	 a	 Basis	 for	 Refusing	 Extradition	 and	 the	 Use	 of	
Diplomatic	Assurances	to	Protect	Against	Torture	After	9/11,	11	INT’L	CRIM.	L.	REV.	1,	5–




19	 U.S.T.	 6223,	 606	 U.N.T.S.	 267;	 Comm.	 Against	 Torture,	 General	 Comment	 No.	 4	
(2017)	on	the	Implementation	of	Article	3	of	the	Convention	in	the	Context	of	Article	








	 184.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Arambasic	 v.	 Ashcroft,	 403	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 951,	 962	 (D.S.D.	 2005);	
Germany	v.	United	States,	No.	06-CV-01201,	2007	WL	2581894,	at	*7	(E.D.N.Y.	Sept.	5,	
2007);	In	re	Extradition	of	Ernst,	No.	97	CRIM.MISC.1	PG.22,	1998	WL	395267,	at	*7–
10	 (S.D.N.Y.	 July	 14,	 1998)	 (finding	 probable	 cause	 to	 extradite	 lacking	 when	
prosecution	presented	only	the	decision	of	a	Swiss	court,	which	failed	to	describe	the	
basis	for	its	decision);	see	also	Note,	Foreign	Trials	in	Absentia:	Due	Process	Objections	
to	 Unconditional	 Extradition,	 13	 STAN.	 L.	 REV.	 370,	 377	 (1961)	 (“The	 established	
practice	in	the	United	States	and	most	other	countries	.	.	.	is	that	a	person	convicted	in	
absentia	is	not	treated	as	a	person	convicted,	but	as	a	person	charged.”).	
	 185.	 See,	 e.g.,	 United	 States	 v.	 Avdic,	 No.	 CR.	 07-M06,	 2007	WL	 1875778,	 at	 *8	
(D.S.D.	 June	 28,	 2007)	 (finding	 probable	 cause	 to	 extradite	 based	 on	 Bosnian	
conviction	in	absentia	when	“an	independent	judicial	officer	in	the	requesting	country	






















systems.	 The	 courts	 have	 used	 a	 number	 of	 flexible	 tests	 when	
evaluating	criminal	procedural	rights	both	in	the	course	of	conviction	
and	in	sentencing.190	On	the	one	hand,	every	defendant	is	guaranteed	
minimum	 standards	 of	 “civilized	 conduct,”	 regardless	 of	 whether	
other	constitutional	provisions	apply.191	On	the	other	hand,	the	courts	




their	 approach	 to	 these	 questions.	 Regarding	 foreign	 evidence—







that	 an	 in	 absentia	 conviction	 does	 not	 preclude	 a	 district	 court	 from	 making	 an	













interrogations193—evidence	 is	 admitted	 unless	 it	 falls	 under	 an	
outlier	 test	 such	 as	 “shocking	 the	 judicial	 conscience.”	 When	
considering	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 upward	
departure	 at	 sentencing,	 there	 are	 few,	 if	 any,	 procedural	 rights	on	










	 194.	 On	 occasion,	 courts	 have	 refused	 to	 consider	 foreign	 convictions	 obtained	
without	the	assistance	of	counsel.	See,	e.g.,	United	States	v.	Moskovits,	784	F.	Supp.	193	
(E.D.	Pa.	1992).	However,	such	practice	undoubtedly	represents	the	exception,	not	the	
rule.	 See	 United	 States	 v.	 Concha,	 294	 F.3d	 1248,	 1254	 (10th	 Cir.	 2002)	 (“[E]ven	











	 196.	 See	 United	 States	 v.	 Small,	 183	 F.	 Supp.	 2d	 755,	 769	 (W.D.	 Pa.	 2002)	
(“Although	[violating	defendant’s	right	to	remain	silent]	would	be	highly	improper	in	
a	 criminal	 prosecution	 in	 the	 United	 States,	 we	 cannot	 say	 that	 the	 prosecutor’s	
actions	.	.	.	rendered	[the	defendant’s]	conviction	unfair.”).	





M06,	 2007	 WL	 1875778,	 at	 *8	 (D.S.D.	 June	 28,	 2007)	 (finding	 probable	 cause	 to	
extradite	 based	 on	 Bosnian	 conviction	 in	 absentia	when	 “an	 independent	 judicial	
officer	in	the	requesting	country	heard	the	evidence	and	found	it	sufficient	to	convict”);	
United	States	v.	Bogue,	No.	CRIM.A.	98-572-M,	1998	WL	966070,	at	*2	(E.D.	Pa.	Oct.	13,	
1998)	 (“A	 determination	 of	 the	 French	 government’s	 procedural	 fairness	 in	
undertaking	the	petitioner’s	trial	in	his	absence	.	.	.	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	Court’s	








above?	 On	 its	 own	 terms,	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach	
coheres.	 The	 U.S.	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 the	 greatest	 interest	 in	
preserving	process	domestically;	the	Court	both	decides	which	Bill	of	
Rights	guarantees	apply	to	the	states	and	what	form	they	should	take	
in	 such	 prosecutions.199	 The	 political	 branches	 then	 have	 the	 next	
highest	 concern	 in	 the	negotiation	 and	 ratification	 of	 human	 rights	
treaties	that	apply	both	abroad	and	at	home.200	And	finally,	the	United	








procedures—even	 those	 procedures	 that	 will	 influence	 domestic	
criminal	prosecutions—as	long	as	there	is	no	flagrant	activity	on	the	
part	of	U.S.	 law	enforcement	and/or	 in	 the	structure	of	 that	 foreign	
legal	 system.202	And	extradition	 is	driven	by	political	 branch	 treaty	
making,	 in	particular	executive	branch	 foreign	affairs	expertise;	 the	
judiciary	then	defers	because	the	political	branches	have	“cleared	the	
space”	with	formal	law	enforcement	agreements.203	
But	 combined,	 these	 two	 approaches	 are	 nonsensical.	 The	
clearest	example	of	such	doctrinal	incoherence	is	that	of	the	CLOUD	
Act,	 which	 draws	 procedural	 lines	 to	 include	 greater	 explicit	
protections	for	foreign	nationals	prosecuted	in	foreign	countries	than	
it	does	U.S.	nationals	prosecuted	abroad	or,	 in	some	instances,	even	
domestically.204	 First,	 the	 CLOUD	Act	 excludes	U.S.	 nationals,	 so	 by	
definition	 foreign	 countries	 are	 advancing	 investigations	 into	 their	
own	 or	 other	 nationals;	 this	 presumably	 gives	 the	 United	 States	 a	
lower	stake	in	the	process.	Second,	in	contrast	to	extraditions,	where	
a	foreign	government	has	already	indicted	an	individual,	CLOUD	Act	
cases	 apply	 to	 investigations,	 which	 almost	 always	 arise	 pre-
 
	 199.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.	As	discussed	in	Part	II.A,	infra,	this	differentiation	is	also	









indictment.205	 There	 is	 thus	 less	 immediate	 risk	 of	 a	 flagrant	 due	
process	 or	 human	 rights	 violation,	 though	 of	 course	 such	 an	
investigation	 may	 lead	 to	 prosecution	 and	 incarceration.	 In	 other	




explicit	 guidance	 on	 core	 criminal	 procedure—more	 than	 in	 other	
contexts—is	 surprising	 because	 the	 U.S.	 government	 has	 less	 of	 a	
stake	in	these	cases.	
Another	example	of	such	doctrinal	incoherence	is	the	treatment	
of	 foreign	 convictions	 in	 absentia.207	 U.S.	 courts	 disfavor	 such	
convictions	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 extradition	 abroad,	 where	 constitutional	
criminal	procedural	rights	otherwise	have	little	applicability.208	And	
yet	 domestically,	 such	 convictions	 may	 be	 the	 basis	 for	 upward	
departure	for	sentences.209	This	is	surprising	because	the	U.S.	criminal	
justice	 system	 should	 presumably	 have	 more	 of	 a	 stake	 in	 the	
administration	 of	 its	 own	 sentences	 than	 it	 does	 in	 prosecutions	
abroad.	
Why	such	doctrinal	incoherence?	The	answer	lies	in	the	historical	
development	 of	 four	 distinct	 legal	 movements—incorporation,	
human	 rights	 codification,	 judicial	 rulings	 on	 constitutional	
extraterritoriality,	 and	 internationalization	 of	 criminal	 law	
enforcement—each	coming	online	at	various	points	in	the	twentieth	
century.	 First,	 judicial	 rulings	 on	 extraterritoriality	 are	 of	 oldest	
vintage	and	are	internally	incoherent;	for	example,	the	Insular	Cases,	
Reid	 v.	 Covert	 and	 Verdugo-Urquidez,	 exemplify	 constitutional	
extraterritoriality	 doctrine	 decided	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	
then	fractured	in	the	twentieth	century.210	Second,	the	human	rights	
movement	began	in	the	1940s	with	the	negotiation	of	the	UDHR	and	
subsequent	 international	 human	 rights	 instruments,	 though	 the	
United	States	has	been	slow	to	ratify	many	of	these	treaties	since	that	
time.211	 Third,	 incorporation	of	 the	U.S.	Bill	 of	Rights	did	not	 occur	


















the	 U.S.	 courts	were	 ruling	 on	 applicability	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	
abroad,	they	were	doing	so	in	a	pre-incorporation	era	and,	mostly,	in	
a	 pre-human	 rights	 era.215	 And	 from	 a	 broader	 transnational	 legal	
process	perspective,	many	of	these	crosscurrents	are	interrelated.	For	
example,	 the	 international	human	rights	movement	derives	 in	 large	
part	from	American	influence	on	the	instruments,	and	the	American	
influence	 is	 largely	 rooted	 in	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution.216	 As	
such,	 many	 of	 these	 concepts	 were	 “uploaded”	 from	 U.S.	 law	 to	
international	human	rights	law,	and	then	“downloaded”	to	many	other	
countries	pursuant	 to	 transnational	 legal	process.217	And	yet,	 in	 the	
United	States,	this	download	has	ironically	stalled	out	in	transnational	
criminal	law	enforcement.	




	 213.	 In	 criminal	 procedure	 in	 particular,	 the	 rise	 of	 law	 enforcement	 abroad	
corresponded	with	the	“constitutionalization”	of	the	Bill	of	Rights	during	the	Warren	
Court	 era;	 reconciling	 these	 trends	 has	 been	 an	 enduring	 challenge	 for	 the	 federal	
courts.	RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	184	(“[T]he	criminal	procedure	revolution	of	the	




of	 constitutional	 extraterritoriality	 and	 intra-territoriality	 exist	 concurrently	 and	
incoherently	today	due	to	their	different	legal	geneses	at	various	points	in	our	history.	
See	RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	7.	









(“The	 law	 that	 we	 are	 bound	 to	 follow	 is,	 instead,	 the	 ‘functional	 approach’	 of	
Boumediene	 and	 the	 ‘significant	 voluntary	 connection’	 test	 of	 Verdugo–Urquidez.”);	
Rodriguez	v.	Swartz,	111	F.	Supp.	3d	1025,	1035	(D.	Ariz.	2015)	(“In	sum,	this	Court	
finds	most	appropriate	to	apply	the	‘practical	considerations’	outlined	in	Boumediene	




and	 in	 the	Supreme	Court.219	The	2010	case	 involved	a	U.S.	Border	
Patrol	agent,	standing	in	the	United	States,	killing	a	Mexican	citizen,	
Sergio	 Adrian	 Hernandez	 Guereca	 (“Hernandez”),	 standing	 in	
Mexico.220	 Hernandez’s	 parents	 subsequently	 brought	 a	 variety	 of	
claims	against	the	agent	and	the	United	States,	including	claims	under	







767	 F.3d	 1,	 31–33	 (D.C.	 Cir.	 2014)	 (Henderson,	 J.,	 concurring)	 (reconciling	 the	
overlapping	 doctrine	 to	 determine	 extraterritorial	 applicability	 of	 the	 Fifth	
Amendment).	





















	 222.	 See	 id.	 at	 265	 (“While	 the	 Boumediene	 Court	 appears	 to	 repudiate	 the	
formalistic	 reasoning	 of	Verdugo-Urquidez’s	 sufficient	 connections	 test,	 courts	 have	
continued	to	rely	on	the	sufficient	connections	test	and	its	related	interpretation	of	the	
















cooperation.	 It	 thus	 affirms	 defendants’	 individual	 rights—rights	
which	 affirm	 individual	 dignity,	 mandate	 necessary	 process,	 and	
delineate	the	 limits	of	government	authority—at	a	 time	where	they	
are	most	 vulnerable	 in	 the	 face	of	not	one,	but	multiple	 sovereigns	







line	 drawing?	 This	 Part	 builds	 a	 normative	 foundation	 for	 core	
criminal	procedure.	 It	 first	 theorizes	such	core,	using	constitutional	
and	global	justice	theory.	It	then	argues	for	a	tripartite	framework—
rooted	 in	 constitutional	 incorporation,	 international	 human	 rights	
obligations,	 and	 comparative	 functionalism—for	 the	 judiciary	 and	










procedural	 and/or	 constitutional	 obligations?	 From	 these	
fundamental	 questions	 emerges	 an	 obvious	 tension,	 one	 scholars	
often	 overlook:	 either	 way,	 cross-border	 law	 enforcement	
cooperation	opens	the	United	States	to	both	praise	and	criticism.	On	
one	hand,	arguments	for	the	status	quo	favor	broad	law	enforcement	
cooperation	 and	 thus	 promotion	 of	 criminal	 accountability	 and	
security—but	open	the	United	States	to	accusations	of	brutal	realism	
that	overrides	individual	rights	and	sucks	individuals	worldwide	into	





rigorous	 rights	 framework	 could	 promote	 the	 United	 States	 as	
laudable	arbiter	of	 individual	rights,	but	opens	it	to	charges	of	both	
cultural	imperialism	and	reluctance	to	assist	other	countries	in	critical	
law	 enforcement	 goals.	 As	 a	 general	 rule,	 a	 greater	 insistence	 on	
criminal	 procedural	 rights	will	 lead	 to	 decreasing	 law-enforcement	
cooperation—at	 the	 extreme,	 insisting	 on	 the	 identical	 criminal	
procedural	 rights	 as	 in	 the	 United	 States	 would	 lead	 to	 the	 total	
cessation	of	any	such	cooperation.223	
One	 starting	 point	 to	 resolve	 this	 tension	 is	 to	 affirm	 its	
contemporary	 inevitability.	 International	 cooperation	 in	 law	
enforcement	 constitutes	 a	 consequential,	 necessary	 shift	 in	 U.S.	
criminal	justice.	Such	cross-border	cooperation	addresses	one	of	the	
central	 concerns	 of	 international	 criminal	 law:	 that	 global	 crime	
metastasizes	 more	 rapidly	 than	 any	 domestic	 or	 international	
institution	 can	 legally	 adapt	 to	 promote	 criminal	 accountability,	
creating	 impunity	 gaps.224	 While	 this	 cross-border	 crime	 may	 be	
traced	to	piracy	in	the	earliest	days	of	the	U.S.	republic	or	the	rise	of	
drug	 trafficking	 in	 the	1970s,	 the	 accelerating	 rate	of	movement	of	
people	 and	 information	 across	 borders	 has	 catalyzed	 a	 new	 era	 of	
global	 crime.225	 The	 U.S.	 government	 knows	 that	while	 its	 borders	
delimit	 the	geographical	boundaries	of	 its	enforcement	 jurisdiction,	
criminality	increasingly	transcends	such	borders.226	As	the	FIFA	and	
Charles	 “Chuckie”	Taylor,	 Jr.	 cases	demonstrate,	 these	borders	now	
represent	 an	 advantage	 for	 criminals,	 who	 exploit	 “national	
sanctuaries”	to	live	in	impunity.227	In	light	of	this,	the	question	is	not	
 
	 223.	 This	 balance	 adds	 a	 transnational	 twist	 to	 the	 classic	 dichotomy	 between	
crime	control	values—emphasizing	efficiency,	speed,	finality,	and	other	characteristics	
that	serve	the	repression	of	criminal	conduct—and	due	process—focusing	on	formal,	
adjudicative,	 adversarial	 processes	 that	 instantiate	 formidable	 “obstacle	 course”	
impediments	 to	 carrying	 an	 accused	 further	 along	 in	 the	 criminal	 process—first	





to	 the	 United	 States.	 Today’s	 criminal	 efforts	 totally	 eclipse	 such	 earlier	 ‘global’	
criminal	ventures.”).	
	 226.	 See	Koh,	 supra	note	 12	 (discussing	 the	 proliferation	 of	 U.S.	 foreign	 affairs	
prosecutions).	
	 227.	 Id.	at	352–55	(discussing	both	the	2015	arrest	of	seven	senior	FIFA	officials	
and	 the	 2008	 conviction	 of	 Charles	 “Chuckie”	 Taylor,	 Jr.—son	 of	 former	 Liberian	








framework	 for	 theorizing	 core	 criminal	 procedure,	 given	 the	 long	
history	 of	 complex	 questions	 regarding	 constitutional	
extraterritoriality	and	scholarship	relating	to	it.	Indeed,	debates	about	
constitutional	 extraterritorial	 applicability	 have	 long	 turned	 on	
shifting	accounts	of	when,	where,	and	to	whom	the	U.S.	Constitution	
applies	 abroad.229	 As	 Gerald	 Neuman	 has	 noted,	 “[t]o	 resolve	 the	
question	of	the	proper	scope	of	the	individual	rights	provisions	of	the	
United	 States	 Constitution,	 it	 is	 useful	 to	 ask	 what	 rights	 in	 a	
constitution	 are	 for,	 and	 in	 particular	 what	 United	 States	
constitutional	 rights	 are	 for.”230	 In	 1991,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 Neuman’s	






constitutional,	 human	 rights,	 and	 functionalist	 analysis.	 This	 Part	 structures	 this	
analysis.	
	 229.	 See	RAUSTIALA,	supra	note	19,	at	7.	A	central	tension	in	these	cases	has	been	






whenever	 the	 United	 States	 acts	 against	 its	 citizens	 abroad,	 it	 may	 do	 so	 only	 in	




287	 (1901)	 (White,	 J.,	 concurring).	 In	 its	 articulation	 of	 the	 doctrine	 of	 “territorial	


























the	meaning	of	 this	phrase	 is	unclear,	 though	 the	 former	 term	may	
mean	 compliance	 is	 impossible	 or	 imposes	 great	 costs	 in	 foreign	
territory,	 while	 the	 latter	 could	 indicate	 cultural	 incongruity	 with	
customs	in	a	foreign	legal	system.234	And	even	in	cases	where	foreign	
law	enforcement	 is	operating	entirely	 independently	 in	 its	 criminal	
investigations	 and	 thus	 the	 Constitution	 does	 not	 apply,	 evidence	
gathered	will	still	be	excluded	when	foreign	law	enforcement	methods	
“shock	 the	 conscience”	 of	 the	 court.235	 This	 discretion	 is	 rooted	 in	
federal	courts’	inherent	“supervisory	powers	over	the	administration	
of	federal	justice.”236		
Furthermore,	 a	 focus	 on	 traditional	 constitutional	 norms	 risks	
overlooking	 the	 international	 human	 rights	 obligations	 that	 govern	
even	in	the	absence	of	formal	constitutional	applicability.	Often	such	
rights	 are	 thought	 irrelevant	 once	 the	 constitutional	 inquiry	 ends;	
such	 ambiguity	 and	 oversight	 is	 reminiscent	 of	 debates	 regarding	











	 236.	 United	 States	 v.	 Emmanuel,	 565	 F.3d	 1324,	 1330	 (11th	 Cir.	 2009)	 (citing	
Birdsell	 v.	 United	 States,	 346	 F.2d	 775,	 782	 n.10	 (5th	 Cir.	 1965);	 United	 States	 v.	
Barona,	56	F.3d	1087,	1091	(9th	Cir.	1995)).	
	 237.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Oona	 A.	 Hathaway	 et	 al.,	Human	 Rights	 Abroad:	When	 Do	 Human	
Rights	 Treaty	 Obligations	 Apply	 Extraterritorially,	 43	 ARIZ.	 ST.	 L.J.	 389	 (2011)	
(surveying	foreign	and	international	tribunals’	approach	to	extraterritorial	application	
of	 human	 rights	 treaties);	 see	 also	 Young,	 supra	 note	 25,	 at	 123–24	 (noting	 that	








outdated	 in	 the	 twenty-first	 century:	 the	 structure	 of	 international	
human	rights	norms	now	includes	virtually	all	countries	of	the	world,	
cohering	 around	 certain	 baseline	 rules	 and	 standards	 that	 ground	
equal	 treatment	 of	 individuals,	 regardless	 of	 nationality.	 For	 the	
United	States,	this	means	especially	the	ICCPR,	and	the	UDHR.239	This	
tension	 is	 salient	 in	 cases	 regarding	 the	war	 on	 terror;	 in	 criminal	
justice,	this	tension	is	heretofore	less	visible.	
2. Global	Justice	Theory		
Global	 justice	 theory	 can	 help	 to	 update	 our	 constitutional	
conception,	 highlighting	 how	 constitutional	 law	 interlocks	 with	
international	human	rights	and	comparative	law.	While	U.S.	criminal	
justice	 has	 traditionally	 unfolded	 only	 on	 a	 domestically	 focused	
paradigm,	 similarly	 “the	 history	 of	 political	 philosophy	 has	 been	






protection	 of	 individual	 rights,	 and	 the	 resulting	 problem	 of	 how	 these	 regimes	
compete	 or	 co-operate	 or	 can	 be	 reconciled	with	 one	 another.”	 Gerald	 L.	 Neuman,	
Human	Rights	and	Constitutions	in	a	Complex	World,	50	IRISH	JURIST 1,	1	(2013);	see	also	
Gerald	L.	Neuman,	Human	Rights	and	Constitutional	Rights:	Harmony	and	Dissonance,	
55	 STAN.	L.	REV.	 1863,	 1874	 (2003)	 (“The	 consensual	 and	 suprapositive	 aspects	 of	
fundamental	 rights	 each	 create	 potential	 for	 conflicting	 claims	 of	 legitimacy	 and	























Returning	 to	 the	 original	 question:	 in	 this	 contemporary	 era,	
what	are	rights	 for?	To	whom	do	we	guarantee	criminal	procedural	
rights,	 where,	 and	 when?	 And—just	 as	 crucially—what	 amount	 of	
process	 is	 required	 in	 this	 space?	 In	 one	 conception,	 attributed	
originally	 to	 Thomas	 Hobbes	 and	 to	 contemporary	 scholars	 in	 the	
nationalism	school,	the	absence	of	a	world	judicial	body	means	that	
anarchy,	 without	 justice,	 characterizes	 international	 affairs.242	 In	
another	conception,	 rooted	 in	 Immanuel	Kant’s	On	Perpetual	Peace,	
democratic	 states	 promote	 a	 peaceful	 world	 order,	 even	 in	 the	
absence	of	 a	 higher	world	 government.243	 John	Rawls’	 contribution	
extends	 this	beyond	merely	democratic	nations	 to	“decent	peoples”	
that,	 though	 not	 democratic,	 respect	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 permit	
dissent.244	 In	his	 conception,	a	 cosmopolitan,	peaceful	world	means	
“respecting	the	right	of	different	peoples	to	establish	varying	political	
constitutions	 within	 certain	 safeguards.”245	 This	 helps	 to	 frame	
questions	 regarding	 the	 duties—including	 the	 criminal	 procedural	
duties—that	 states	 owe	 to	 foreign	 nationals.	 From	 a	 Hobbesian	
nationalist	 viewpoint,	 a	 state	 owes	 no	 duties	 to	 those	 beyond	 its	
borders.246	 To	 the	 Kantian,	 the	 individual—not	 the	 state—is	 the	
highest	 unit	 of	 moral	 concern	 and	 thus	 entitled	 to	 equal	 respect,	








	 242.	 Brooks,	 supra	 note	 240,	 at	 xv;	 see	 THOMAS	HOBBES,	THE	 ELEMENTS	 OF	 LAW,	
NATURAL	AND	POLITIC	182	(J.C.A.	Gaskin	ed.,	Oxford	Univ.	Press	1994)	(1650)	(“For	that	















point,	 the	 question	 becomes	what	 practical	 steps	 a	 country	 should	
take	in	order	to	satisfy	those	duties.248		
Rawls	 and	 another	 theorist	 in	 this	 tradition—Charles	 Beitz—
provide	 particular	 guidance	 here.	 To	 start,	 Rawls’s	 Law	 of	 Peoples	
distinguishes	 between	 rights	 guaranteed	 domestically	 and	 those	
guaranteed	 between	 peoples	 of	 different	 nations.249	 He	 makes	 the	
distinction	between	reasonable	pluralism	of	comprehensive	doctrines	
within	 a	 constitutional	 democracy	 and	 an	 even	 greater	 diversity	
among	decent	peoples	with	many	different	cultures	and	traditions.250	
Despite	such	variety,	however,	free	and	democratic	peoples	will	agree	
on	 certain	 principles	 of	 justice,	 including	 that	 they	 are	 to	 “honor	
human	rights.”251	While	the	specific	rights	on	which	Rawls	insists	is	a	
source	 of	 debate,252	 Rawls	 justifies	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	
approach	 to	 fundamental	 rights,	 given	 that	 the	 U.S.	 federal	










of	 Peoples—its	 ideals,	 principles,	 and	 standards—and	 how	 those	 norms	 apply	 to	
political	relations	among	peoples.”).	Since	its	publication,	The	Law	of	Peoples	has	been	
heavily	criticized	on	a	variety	of	fronts.	See,	e.g.,	Seyla	Benhabib,	The	Law	of	Peoples,	
Distributive	 Justice,	and	Migrations,	 72	FORDHAM	L.	REV.	1761,	1761	 (2004)	 (arguing	
that	 Rawls’s	 emphasis	 on	 political	 communities	 and	 the	 modern	 nation-state	
abandoned	 the	 Kantian	 framework	 of	 liberal	 cosmopolitanism);	 Charles	 R.	 Beitz,	
Rawls’s	 Law	 of	 Peoples,	 110	 ETHICS	 669,	 669–96	 (2000);	 Thomas	 W.	 Pogge,	Moral	
Universalism	and	Global	Economic	Justice,	1	POL.	PHIL.	&	ECON.	29,	29–58	(2002).	




identifies	a	narrower	core	of	human	rights,	such	as	 the	right	 to	 life,	 right	 to	 liberty,	
right	to	property,	and	to	formal	equality.	Id.	at	59–65.	Such	distinctions	are	one	of	many	
critiques	that	scholars	have	advanced	against	The	Law	of	Peoples.	See	BROCK,	supra	note	
245,	 at	 28	 (“Another	 common	 observation	 is	 that	 Rawls	 provides	 very	 little	
argument	.	.	.	 for	why	decent	societies	would	endorse	only	 the	 limited	set	of	human	
rights	 [whereas]	 liberal	 societies	 .	.	.	 would	want	 to	 add	more	 to	 the	 list	 of	 human	
rights	.	.	.	.”).	Rawls	uses	the	case	of	fair	trade	to	show	that—in	addition	to	principles	
that	define	the	basic	equality	of	all	peoples—parties	will	establish	guidelines	to	set	up	
cooperative	 organizations	 and	 agree	 to	 standards	 of	 fairness	 of	 trade	 alongside	
provisions	for	mutual	assistance.	Rawls,	supra	note	249,	at	231.	
	 252.	 BROCK,	supra	note	245,	at	38	(“Quite	apart	from	which	[human	rights]	Rawls	





U.S.	 states	 and	 the	 federal	 government,	 and	 second	by	determining	
which	 rights	 are	 guaranteed	 between	 and	 among	 nation	 states.253	
Incorporation	 first	 allows	 for	procedural	diversity	but	provides	 the	
greatest	 guidance	 to	 individual	 U.S.	 states	 regarding	 criminal	
procedural	 rights	 guarantees;	 fewer	 are	 then	 provided	 in	 cases	 of	
extradition	 and	 recognition	 of	 foreign	 criminal	 judgments.254	 In	
furtherance	 of	 such	 second	 category,	 American	 leadership	 in	 the	
creation	 of	 multilateral	 institutions	 such	 as	 Interpol,255	 the	 United	
Nations	Office	on	Drugs	and	Crime,256	the	Egmont	Group	of	Financial	
Intelligence	 Units,257	 and	 various	 parts	 of	 the	 Organization	 of	
American	States258	provide	some	grounding	for	multilateral	criminal	
law	 enforcement	 cooperation	 and	 standards,	while	 extradition	 and	
mutual	 legal	 assistance	 treaties	 ground	 bilateral	 law	 enforcement	
cooperation.259	
Even	more	 to	 the	 point,	 Charles	 Beitz	 advances	 two	 potential	
grounds	 for	 thinking	 about	 human	 rights—and	 thus,	 by	 definition,	
certain	criminal	procedural	rights—as	a	neutral,	“nonparochial”	basis	
for	 criminal	 procedural	 line	 drawing.260	 First,	 human	 rights	 could	
meet	 a	 reasonableness—as	 opposed	 to	 complete	 agreement—
standard.261	This	then	provides	a	universal	and	legitimate	basis	from	
which	 to	 criticize	 states	 and,	 thus,	 constrain	 them.262	 Drawing	 on	
Michael	Walzer,	Beitz	notes	that	a	comparison	of	moral	codes	across	
societies	may	produce	a	set	of	universal	standards—including	human	
rights	 and	 certain	 rules	 such	 as	 those	 prohibiting	 murder,	 deceit,	
 
	 253.	 Rawls,	 supra	 note	 249,	 at	 231	 (arguing	 that	 peoples’	 “concern	 for	 human	
rights	leads	them	to	limit	a	state’s	right	of	internal	sovereignty”).	
	 254.	 See	supra	Part	I.A.	



















torture,	 and	 oppression—that	 constitute	 a	 “moral	 minimum.”263	
Second,	Beitz	also	offers	the	Rawlsian	idea	of	“overlapping	consensus”	
of	political	moralities	to	accentuate	rights	acceptable	by	a	reasonable	
person	 consistently	 with	 acceptance	 of	 any	 of	 the	 main	 global	
conceptions	 of	 political	 and	 economic	 justice.264	 Broader	 than	 a	
“common	 core”	 of	 human	 rights,	 it	 would	 instead	 reflect	 a	 broad	
account	 of	 rights	 that	 each	 culture	 could	 reasonably	 accept	 as	
consistent	 with	 its	 moral	 conventions.265	 Without	 fully	 endorsing	
either	conception,	Beitz	notes	that	human	rights	signal	 the	minimal	
legitimacy	of	a	society.266	In	other	words,	while	human	rights	may	not	
indicate	 that	 a	 nation	 is	 fully	 legitimate,	 such	 rights	may	meet	 the	
threshold	 necessary	 for	 the	 nation	 to	merit	 respect	 as	 a	minimally	
legitimate	cooperating	member	of	international	society.267	
Beitz’s	 framework	 helps	 theorize	 a	 field	 in	 which	 judges,	 law	
enforcement,	and	diplomats	are	making	criminal	procedural	decisions	
in	 law	 enforcement	 cooperation.	 In	 this	 space,	 criminal	 procedural	
rights	 are	 not	 rigid	 protections	 that	 simply	 do	 or	 do	 not	 exist.268	
Instead,	a	broad	standard	of	reasonableness	governs	cooperation,	as	
certain	rights	provide	 indicia	of	minimal	 legitimacy	 for	purposes	of	
extradition,	mutual	 legal	assistance,	and	other	 forms	of	 information	
sharing.269	 And	 furthermore,	 multilateral	 human	 rights	 treaties	
provide	a	contractarian	foundation	for	the	legal	duties	that	states	owe	
to	their	own	and	other	nationals,	in	the	form	of	criminal	procedural	
rights.270	 This	 both	 explains	 and	 justifies	 U.S.	 law	 enforcement	



















law	 as	 a	 foundation	 for	 a	 cosmopolitan	 conception	 of	 law,	 natural	 law	 seems	





political	 theoretical	 perspective,	 their	 commitment	 to	 enumerated	
human	 rights	 as	 holistic	 systems,	 while	 not	 identical,	 provide	
reasonable	protection	along	certain	constitutional	safeguards.	This	is	
what	 Rawls	 identified	 as	 one	 of	 the	 essential	 criteria	 for	 liberal	
peoples,	 namely,	 a	 reasonably	 just	 constitutional	 democratic	
government	 that	 serves	 their	 fundamental	 interests.272	 Such	
governments	are	effectively	under	the	political	and	electoral	control	









Moving	 now	 from	 theory	 toward	 practice,	 what	 constitutes	
reasonableness	when	evaluating	a	foreign	country’s	criminal	 justice	
system?	Evaluation	of	foreign	criminal	justice	systems	is	a	particular,	








be	 a	 legitimate	 legal	 system,	 on	 this	 view,	 requires	 satisfying	 some	 basic	 moral	





procedure;	 real-world	 criminal	 procedural	 line	 drawing	 also	 informs	 global	 justice	
theory	by	 focusing	on	 a	 legal	methodology	 to	 assess	what	 specific	 legal	 rights	may	
constitute	a	“core”	from	a	Rawlsian	law	of	peoples	perspective.	
	 276.	 Jia,	supra	note	22	(manuscript	at	30–31)	(“Can	American	 judges	accurately	






which	we	are	 accustomed.	But	 to	one	brought	up	within	 it,	 varying	 emphasis,	 tacit	
assumptions,	 unwritten	practices,	 a	 thousand	 influences	 gained	only	 from	 life,	may	
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Posner278	 have	 run	 the	 gamut	 in	 their	 comfort	 and	 willingness	 to	
evaluate	such	foreign	legal	systems.279	The	answer	is	to	ground	rights	





	 278.	 Bodum	 USA,	 Inc.	 v.	 La	 Cafetiere,	 Inc.,	 621	 F.3d	 624,	 633	 (7th	 Cir.	 2010)	




	 279.	 Jia,	 supra	note	22	 (manuscript	 at	 31–32)	 (situating	Holmes	 and	Posner	on	
opposite	 ends	 of	 a	 continuum	 of	 legal-cultural	 translation).	 To	 some	 degree,	 this	
question	 is	 inherent—and,	 arguably,	 an	 inherent	 flaw—in	 any	 reasonableness	
standard.	To	use	a	famous	and	familiar	example,	the	Katz	test—which	asks	whether	an	
individual’s	 subjective	 expectation	 of	 privacy	 is	 one	 that	 society	 recognizes	 as	
reasonable	for	purposes	of	determining	what	constitutes	a	“search”	under	the	Fourth	
Amendment—is	often	criticized	for	placing	such	societal	determinations	in	the	hands	
of	 the	 subjective	 assessments	 of	 judges.	 Katz	 v.	 United	 States,	 389	 U.S.	 347,	 361	
(Harlan,	 J.,	 concurring);	 see,	 e.g.,	 Orin	 S.	 Kerr,	 Four	 Models	 of	 Fourth	 Amendment	
Protection,	60	STAN.	L.	REV.	503,	504	(2007)	(“[N]o	one	seems	to	know	what	makes	an	
expectation	of	privacy	constitutionally	‘reasonable’”);	Carpenter	v.	United	States,	138	
S.	 Ct.	 2206,	 2246	 (2018)	 (Thomas,	 J.,	 dissenting)	 (“The	 only	 thing	 the	 past	 three	
decades	have	established	about	the	Katz	test	is	that	society’s	expectations	of	privacy	
bear	 an	 uncanny	 resemblance	 to	 those	 expectations	 of	 privacy	 that	 this	 Court	
considers	 reasonable.”	 (internal	 quotations	 omitted)).	 In	 the	 cross-border	 context,	
policymakers	 and	 judges	may	 similarly	 default	 to	 their	 own	 expectation	 of	what	 is	
reasonable,	 which	 to	 some	 degree	 is	 rooted	 in	 their	 historically	 and	 culturally	
contingent	assessments	as	to	what	process	is	“good	enough.”	This	may	open	them	to	
the	charge	that	they	find	Western	countries	“good	enough”	and	non-Western	countries	
lacking,	 a	 variation	 on	 the	 racial	 disparity	 questions	 that	 plague	 criminal	 justice	
systems	today.	See	Jia,	supra	note	22	(manuscript	at	58–59)	(describing	how	a	judge	
may	use	“a	Western	ear”	to	cause	bias).	
	 280.	 A	 broad	 reasonableness	 regime	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 the	 European	 Court	 of	
Human	Rights’	“margin	of	appreciation,”	wherein	compromises	are	made	between	the	
goals	of	 fundamental	 rights	and	 the	 circumstances	 for	 limitations	 to	 these	 rights	 in	
particular	 national	 jurisdictions.	 See	 Janneke	 Gerards,	Margin	 of	 Appreciation	 and	
Incrementalism	in	the	Case	Law	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	18	HUM.	RTS.	L.	
REV.	495,	498	(2018).	The	Restatement	(Third)	of	Foreign	Relations	Law	also	advanced	
reasonableness	 as	 a	 limitation	 on	 the	 jurisdiction	 to	 prescribe,	 though	 this	 was	
removed	in	the	Fourth	Restatement.	Compare	RESTATEMENT	(THIRD)	OF	FOREIGN	RELS.	L.	
OF	THE	U.S.	§	403(1)	(AM.	L.	INST.	1987)	(“Even	when	one	of	the	bases	for	jurisdiction	










and	comparative	 legal	method	are	applicable.281	 First,	 international	
human	 rights	 norms	 provide	 a	 global	 baseline	 of	 individual	
protections,	 rooted	 in	 universality,	 human	 autonomy,	 and	 human	
















treaties	 as	 a	 procedural	 baseline	 in	 the	 extradition	 and	 constitutional	







	 285.	 See,	 e.g.,	Mark	Tushnet,	The	Possibilities	 of	 Comparative	Constitutional	 Law,	
108	 YALE	 L.J.	 1225,	 1238–69	 (1999)	 (examining	 the	 role	 of	 functionalism	 in	
comparative	constitutional	law).	Of	course,	as	an	epistemological	matter,	one	criminal	
justice	 system	 cannot	 completely	 understand	 another	 from	 that	 foreign	 criminal	
justice	system’s	“internal	perspective,”	given	that	legal	rules	and	texts	are	themselves	
deeply	rooted	within	a	distinct	economic,	political,	moral,	and	cultural	 context.	Nils	
Jansen,	Comparative	 Law	 and	 Comparative	 Knowledge,	 in	THE	OXFORD	HANDBOOK	 OF	
COMPARATIVE	LAW,	supra	note	28,	at	306	(“For	a	long	time,	comparative	lawyers	have	
regarded	 it	 as	 their	 methodological	 problem	 to	 be	 gaining	 knowledge	 of	 another	
system	and	understand	its	way	of	reasoning:	in	applying	concepts,	rules	or	precedents,	
and,	more	basically,	in	knowing	the	relevant	sources	of	knowledge.”).	Criminal	justice	
is	 “culture-bearing,”	 and	 as	 an	 artifact	 of	 culture	 brings	 with	 it	 the	 challenges	 of	
translating	one	culture	 to	another.	 Joshua	Kleinfeld,	Two	Cultures	of	Punishment,	68	
STAN.	 L.	REV.	 933,	 940	 (2016)	 (“[Criminal	 justice]	 is	 .	.	.	 the	 site	 at	 which	 cultures	




of	 French,	 American,	 and	 European	 Union	 judicial	 decision-making	 and	 related	
discursive	practices	within	each	system).	And	functionalism	itself	is	both	mainstream	
and	highly	 criticized	 as	 a	 comparative	 legal	methodology.	See	 Jansen,	 supra,	 at	 308	
(“[C]omparative	 lawyers	 have	 always	 analysed	 legal	 rules	 and	 systems	 in	 their	
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gets	 to	 the	 nub	 of	 how,	 holistically,	 certain	 sets	 of	 rights	 and	
procedures	 in	a	 foreign	criminal	 justice	system	constitute	sufficient	
criminal	 process,	 even	 though	 individual	 rights	 may	 not—indeed,	
cannot—function	 in	precisely	 the	same	way	 in	any	two	systems.	As	





punishment	 likely	 views	 offender	 criminality	 as	 immutable	 and	
devaluing,	while	European	culture	does	not.286	
This	 Part	 addresses	 this	 question	 by	 providing	 a	 tripartite	
framework	 for	 evaluating	 foreign	 sovereigns.	 It	 then	 prescribes	





policymakers	 should	draw	on	 three	 sources	when	articulating	 core	
criminal	 procedure.	 First,	 judges	 and	 policymakers	 should	 use	 U.S.	
 
historical	 context,	 reconstructing	 the	 individual	 functions	 of	 rules	 from	within	 the	
individual	legal	system.”);	Ralf	Michaels,	The	Functional	Method	of	Comparative	Law,	
in	 THE	 OXFORD	 HANDBOOK	 OF	 COMPARATIVE	 LAW,	 supra	 note	 28,	 at	 340–43	 (“The	
functional	method	 has	 become	 both	 the	mantra	 and	 the	 bête	 noire	 of	 comparative	
law.”).	While	 a	more	 rigorous	 defense	 of	 functionalism	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	
Article,	 suffice	 it	 to	say	 that	 functionalism	advantageously	avoids	essentializing	any	
particular	legal	element	in	a	given	legal	system,	instead	focusing	on	its	connection	with	






the	 presumption	 of	 innocence	 than	 the	 United	 States	 does,	 opting	 instead	 for	
protections	for	the	guilty	and	thus	inflicting	less	excessive	punishment).	The	doctrine	




the	 Insular	Cases,	Eisentrager,	and	Reid:	the	 idea	 that	questions	of	extraterritoriality	
turn	 on	 objective	 factors	 and	 practical	 concerns,	 not	 formalism.”).	 And	 it	 provides	







constitutional	 procedure	 rights	 as	 their	 baseline.	 This	 can	 include	
both	resemblance	to	enumerated	rights	 in	the	U.S.	Constitution	and	
lessons	 from	 the	 incorporation	 of	 procedural	 guarantees.	 For	
example,	 as	 noted	 above,	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment	 due	 process	
clause	does	not	incorporate	the	Fifth	Amendment	right	to	indictment	
by	 grand	 jury,	 suggesting	 that	 it	 is	 not	 as	 fundamental	 to	 Anglo-
American	 jurisprudence	 as,	 say,	 the	 right	 to	 a	 speedy	 and	 public	
trial.287	This	provides	a	clear	basis	upon	which	to	reject	any	defendant	
challenge	 that	 a	 foreign	 process	 violates	 this	 right	 because	 it	 lacks	
indictment	by	grand	jury.	
Second,	the	branches	should	consider	international	human	rights	
standards.	 As	 noted	 in	 Part	 I	 above,	 the	 history	 of	 negotiation	 and	
ratification	of	international	human	rights	instruments	demonstrates	
the	U.S.	government’s	willingness	to	affirm	certain	rights	as	core.	And	







to	 ask	 how	 certain	 rights	 have	 been	 or	will	 be	 upheld	 in	 a	 foreign	
criminal	justice	system.	This	functionalism	analysis	materially	differs	
from	the	incorporation	context,	which	asks	more	narrowly	whether	
the	provision	was	 fundamental	 to	Anglo-American	 jurisprudence.290	
Instead,	 the	 query	 is	 whether	 such	 rights	 may	 be	 reasonably	
interpreted	as	upheld	based	on	that	legal	system’s	own	terms.	So,	for	
example,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 civil	 law	 investigating	 judge	 is	 foreign	 to	








act	 or	 omission	 which	 did	 not	 constitute	 a	 criminal	 offence,	 under	 national	 or	
international	law,	at	the	time	when	it	was	committed.”);	U.S.	CONST.	art.	I,	§	9	(“No	.	.	.	
ex	post	 facto	Law	shall	 be	passed.”);	U.S.	CONST.	art.	 I,	 §	10	 (“No	State	 shall	 .	.	.	 pass	
any	.	.	.	ex	post	facto	Law.”).	








before	 criminal	 proceedings	 begin.	 But	 from	 a	 functionalist	
perspective	this	judicial	role	makes	sense,	given	civil	 law	judges	act	
within	a	broader	system	 lacking	a	 jury;	 in	such	systems,	 judges	are	
making	 factual	 and	 legal	 determinations	 as	 neutral	 adjudicators	
determining	 guilt	 or	 innocence.	 Indeed,	 a	 functionalist	 perspective	




and	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 of	 the	 U.S.	 Constitution	 and	 has	 been	
incorporated	through	the	Fourteenth	Amendment	Due	Process	Clause	




ICCPR—given	 it	 is	 a	 creature	 of	 common	 law	 and	 conspicuously	
absent	 from	most	civil	 law	jurisdictions.294	And	second,	deploying	a	
functionalist	 view,	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 jury	 trial	 right	 in	 foreign	
jurisdictions	 is	 not	 problematic	 from	 a	 holistic	 comparative	
perspective,	given	that	in	civil	law	countries	judges	are	making	factual	
and	legal	determinations	as	neutral	adjudicators.	As	such,	courts	may	
deny	 defendants’	 challenges	 to	 admission	 of	 evidence,	 upward	
departure	of	sentences,	or	extradition	if	such	challenges	are	grounded	




	 291.	 Michaels,	 supra	note	285,	 at	47–48	 (“Institutions,	both	 legal	 and	non-legal,	
even	 doctrinally	 different	 ones,	 are	 deemed	 comparable	 if	 they	 are	 functionally	























codified	 in	 the	 ICCPR,	wherein	Article	 14(3)(b)	 affirms	defendants’	
right	“[t]o	have	adequate	time	and	facilities	for	the	preparation	of	his	
defence	 and	 to	 communicate	with	 counsel	 of	 his	 own	 choosing.”297	
And	finally,	a	functionalist	comparative	analysis	affirms	that	virtually	
all	states	guarantee	a	right	 to	counsel.298	 Indeed,	while	counsel	 in	a	
civil	 law	 system	 relies	 less	 on	 adversarial	 functions	 such	 as	 cross-
examining	witnesses,	it	plays	a	largely	analogous	function	vis-à-vis	the	
state	 and	 the	 judiciary	 in	 civil	 law	 systems.299	 But	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Rwandan	 gacaca	 courts,	 which	 included	 a	 community-based	
conception	of	 justice	but	lacked	a	functional	equivalent	of	a	right	to	
counsel,300	 U.S.	 courts	 should	 not	 rely	 on	 such	 proceedings	 for	
purposes	 of	 upward	 departure.	 The	 U.S.	 District	 Court	 for	 the	












	 296.	 Gideon	 v.	 Wainwright,	 372	 U.S.	 335	 (1963)	 (incorporating	 the	 Sixth	
Amendment	right	to	counsel).	
	 297.	 ICCPR,	supra	note	96.	
	 298.	 Laura	 K.	 Abel	 &	 Lora	 J.	 Livingston,	 The	 Existing	 Civil	 Right	 to	 Counsel	
Infrastructure,	JUDGES	J.,	Fall	2008,	at	24,	24	(2008).	
	 299.	 See	 VIVIENNE	 O’CONNOR,	 PRACTITIONER’S	 GUIDE:	 COMMON	 LAW	 AND	 CIVIL	 LAW	




(N.D.	 Iowa	Feb.	 7,	 2017)	 (explaining	 how	Rwandan	 communities	were	 tasked	with	
prosecuting	genocide	perpetrators).	





tension	when	 foreign	affairs	and	criminal	 justice	mix:	 the	executive	
branch	has	comparative	foreign	affairs	expertise,	while	the	legislature	
has	an	affirmative	mandate	to	articulate	criminal	law	and	procedure.	
In	 traditional	 criminal	 cases,	 all	 three	 government	 branches	 play	
familiar	 roles.	 Congress	 passes	 criminal	 laws,	 the	 executive	 branch	
enforces	 them,	and	 the	 judiciary	adjudicates	questions	arising	 from	
them.	But	contemporary	cross-border	law	enforcement	cooperation	
complicates	 this	 picture,	 particularly	 because	 courts	 are	 less	
equipped—though	 arguably	 not	 ill-equipped—to	 evaluate	 foreign	
jurisdictions’	 criminal	 justice	 systems.	 In	 other	 words,	 criminal	
procedural	line	drawing	is	both	outside	of	core	judicial	competence—
because	courts	are	not	foreign	affairs	authorities302—and	within	it—




of	 the	 doctrinal	 tensions	 and	 ambiguities	 above	 by	 drawing	 on	 the	
executive’s	 foreign	 affairs	 expertise,	 followed	 by	 Congress	 and	 the	
judiciary	 exercising	 their	 more	 traditional	 functions	 as	 criminal	
justice	system	actors.	
Broadly	 speaking,	 a	 prescriptive	 institutional	 account	 must	
uphold	 two	 broad	 principles.	 First,	 returning	 to	 the	 descriptive	
taxonomy	 in	 Part	 I,	 criminal	 procedural	 evaluation	 in	 this	 space	
should	 shift	 toward	 the	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach—which	
includes	a	deliberate,	ex	ante,	core	criminal	procedure	to	which	other	
sovereigns	must	adhere—from	the	outlier	approach—a	more	ad	hoc,	
retrospective,	 generalized	 assessment	 of	 foreign	 criminal	 justice	












the	 Problem	 of	 Sovereignty,	 90	 B.U.	 L.	REV.	 1973,	 2003	 (2010)	 (“I	 do	 not	 want	 to	
overstate	the	current	willingness	of	courts	to	relax	their	deference	to	foreign	affairs	





that	arise	 in	 cross-border	 spaces.305	And	second,	all	 three	branches	
should	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 engage	 more	 explicitly	 in	 an	










the	 context	 of	 extradition,	wherein	 a	U.S.	 citizen	may	be	 physically	
transferred	 abroad	 to	 be	 prosecuted	 there?	More	 explicit	 guidance	




conclude	 a	 bilateral	 law	 enforcement	 treaty	 with	 another	
sovereign.309	 As	 noted	 at	 the	 outset,	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 is	 an	
explanatory	 account,	 grounded	 in	 what	 is	 likely	 State	 Department	
attorney	practice.	It	is	not	a	coincidence,	for	example,	that	the	United	






	 307.	 See	 The	 Nature,	 Purpose,	 and	 Function	 of	 Criminal	 Law,	 in	 CONTEMPORARY	
CRIMINAL	LAW	1,	5	(2019).	
	 308.	 18	U.S.C.	§	2523(b)(1)(B)(iii).	The	Act	also	specifies	certain	requirements	for	
the	 agreements	 themselves,	 such	 as	 a	 prohibition	on	 targeting	U.S.	 persons.	See	18	
U.S.C.	§	2523(b)(4).	As	noted	above,	the	CLOUD	Act	specifies	fair	trial	rights;	freedom	
of	expression,	association,	and	peaceful	assembly;	prohibitions	on	arbitrary	arrest	and	
detention;	 and	 prohibitions	 against	 torture	 and	 cruel,	 inhuman,	 or	 degrading	
treatment	or	punishment.	
	 309.	 See	 generally	 U.S.	DEP’T	 OF	 STATE,	 SUPPLEMENTARY	HANDBOOK	 ON	 THE	 C-175	
PROCESS:	ROUTINE	SCIENCE	AND	TECHNOLOGY	AGREEMENTS	(2009)	(providing	an	overview	
of	 treaty	 negotiation	 and	 ratification,	which	 includes	 inter-agency	 consultation	 and	
review).	
	 310.	 By	“rule	of	law”	I	mean,	broadly,	“a	requirement	that	people	in	positions	of	








DOJ,	 has	 the	 foreign	 affairs	 expertise	 and	 negotiation	 capability	 to	
conclude	 law	 enforcement	 treaties	 with	 foreign	 countries.	 But	 the	
State	 Department	 should	 also	 make	 such	 findings	 more	 explicit,	
particularly	 in	 the	 transmittal	 of	 such	 information	 to	 Congress	 for	
advice	and	consent	prior	to	ratification.	As	of	now,	such	findings	are	
largely	 non-existent.311	 In	 virtually	 all	 cases,	 this	 ensures	 that	 the	
executive	branch’s	evaluation	of	foreign	process—rooted	in	its	foreign	









and	 determined	 that	 [extradition	 of	 individuals	 to	 that	 country]	 is	
sufficiently	 fair.”313	As	 such,	 the	executive	has	no	occasion	 to	argue	
about	foreign	criminal	procedure	in	an	extradition	proceeding.	Thus,	
courts	are	right	to	generally	uphold	the	rule	of	non-inquiry,	given	that	
it	 reflects	 the	 considered	 position	 of	 the	 executive	 branch	 in	
evaluating,	 among	 other	 things,	 process	 in	 a	 foreign	 country.	 But	
often,	 courts	 are	 relying	 on	 ad	 hoc	 determinations	 about	 foreign	
criminal	process.314	More	explicit	executive	branch	findings	regarding	
foreign	process	mitigates	the	problem	of	the	parochial	district	court	

































application	 may	 at	 first	 appear	 distinct	 from	 the	 domestic	 and	
transnational	 contexts	 described	 above.	 And	 yet	 the	 ultimate	
concern—how	 the	 United	 States	 conceives	 of	 criminal	 procedure	
rights	when	engaging	with	other	jurisdictions—is	the	same.	As	such,	
 
	 315.	 For	 a	 country	 with	 which	 law	 enforcement	 cooperation	 is	 minimal,	 the	
executive	branch	may	lack	public	representations	regarding	the	state	of	the	country’s	
criminal	justice	system.	For	example,	as	noted	above,	the	United	States	does	not	have	






DEP’T	 STATE	 (2018),	 https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on	
-human-rights-practices	 [https://perma.cc/HB5P-F7W7].	 Such	 reports	 could	
constitute	a	basis	for	judicial	evaluation	of	foreign	countries’	criminal	process.	
	 316.	 While	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	Article,	in	the	long	term	courts	could	also	
“constitutionalize”	 this	 space—or,	 arguably,	 do	 so	 once	 again.	 As	 noted	 above,	 the	





















this	 Part	 completes	 the	 discussion	 of	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 by	
considering	 its	 function	in	the	third	of	 three	tiers	 in	which	criminal	




with	 international	 criminal	 courts.	 As	 is	 well	 known,	 the	 United	
States—and	 the	 international	 community	 as	 a	 whole—has	 created	
international	and	hybrid	tribunals	to	prosecute	atrocity	crimes.317	U.S.	
leadership	 has	 included	 creation	 of	 the	 post-World	 War	 II	
International	 Military	 Tribunals	 in	 Nuremberg,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 U.N.	
International	 Criminal	 Tribunals	 for	 the	 former	 Yugoslavia	 and	 for	
Rwanda.318	More	recently,	however,	the	United	States	has	entered	a	
period	 of	 oscillating	 hostility	 and	 engagement	 towards	 the	
International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	and	has	signed	but	not	ratified	the	
Rome	 Statute	 of	 the	 ICC.319	 For	 example,	 when	 serving	 as	 Trump	



















	 320.	 John	Bolton,	Nat’l	 Sec.	Advisor,	Address	at	 the	Federalist	 Society	 (Sept.	10,	
2018),	https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/full-text-john-bolton-speech	
-federalist-society-180910172828633.html	[https://perma.cc/H4Y5-G93L].	




	 322.	 See,	e.g.,	Lee	A.	Casey,	The	Case	Against	 the	 International	Criminal	Court,	25	
FORDHAM	INT’L	L.J.	 840,	 861–64	 (2002)	 (“[N]either	 international	 criminal	 courts	 in	
general,	 nor	 the	 ICC	 in	 particular,	 provide	protections	 to	 the	 accused	 equivalent	 to	
310	 MINNESOTA	LAW	REVIEW	 [105:251	
	
as	 guaranteed	 by	 Article	 III	 and	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 of	 the	 U.S.	
Constitution.323	
Core	 criminal	 procedure	 undermines	 this	 claim.	 As	 the	 above	
discussion	makes	clear,	 the	U.S.	 legal	 system	 long	ago	abandoned	a	
strict	demand	for	criminal	procedural	sameness	when	it—in	contrast	
to	 certain	 civil	 law	 jurisdictions,	 such	 as	 Brazil324—made	 the	
determination	 that	 it	 would	 extradite	 its	 own	 nationals	 for	
prosecution	in	other	countries.325	And	the	U.S.	government	has	since	
demonstrated	 across	 various	 doctrinal	 areas	 that	 it	 is	 relatively	
comfortable	with	deferring	 to	 foreign	criminal	process	so	 long	as	 it	
does	 not	 violate	 certain	 criminal	 procedural	 norms.326	 As	 already	
discussed	above,	the	right	to	trial	by	jury	is	not	and	likely	should	not	
be	 affirmed	 as	 necessary	 at	 all	 times	 in	 the	 cross-border	 context,	
particularly	given	that	international	tribunals	operate	with	judges	as	
fact	 finders	 in	 a	 manner	 derived	 from	 civil	 law	 systems.327	 And	








	 323.	 See	 Casey,	supra	 note	 322,	 at	 861	 (“First,	 and	 foremost,	 the	 Rome	 Statute	
makes	 no	 provision	 for	 trial	 by	 jury.”);	 JOHAN	D.	 VAN	DER	VYVER,	 IMPLEMENTATION	OF	
INTERNATIONAL	LAW	IN	THE	UNITED	STATES	 181	 (2010)	 (“The	argument	 that	 seems	 to	
surface	most	frequently	questions	the	constitutional	tenability	of	a	treaty	that	would	
expose	nationals	of	the	United	States	to	criminal	prosecution	without	the	benefit	of	a	
jury	 trial	 as	 guaranteed	 by	 the	 Sixth	 Amendment	 .	.	.	.”	 (citing	 JACKSON	 NYAMUYA	







	 324.	 CONSTITUIÇÃO	 FEDERAL	 [C.F.]	 [CONSTITUTION]	 art.	 LI	 (Braz.)	 (“[N]o	 Brazilian	
shall	be	extradited,	except	for	a	naturalized	Brazilian	for	a	common	crime	committed	










Carl	 Kaysen	 eds.,	 2000)))	 (“[T]he	 ICC	 is	 carefully	 structured	 with	 procedural	
2020]	 CORE	CRIMINAL	PROCEDURE	 311	
	
of	 Procedure	 and	 Evidence	 demonstrates	 a	 pre-trial,	 trial,	 and	
appellate	 procedural	 system	 that	 safeguards	 the	 Rome	 Statute’s	
Article	55	rights	of	persons	during	an	investigation—which	includes	




In	 the	 past,	 both	 scholars	 and	 State	 Department	 officials	 have	
emphasized	 the	 ICC’s	 procedural	 acceptability.330	 Louis	 Henkin,	





by-right	 through	 the	 Rome	 Statute,	 showing	 how—broadly	





This	 is	 not	 to	 say	 that	 the	 ICC’s	 procedural	 system	 is	 ideal,	 or	




Rights	 and	 other	 liberal	 constitutional	 systems.”);	 Patricia	 M.	 Wald,	 International	
Criminal	Courts—A	Stormy	Adolescence,	46	VA.	J.	INT’L	L.	319,	345	(2006)	(“Opposition	
is	sometimes	voiced	.	.	.	that	the	procedures	of	the	ICC	do	not	provide	the	fundamental	





























engagement	 with	 new	 investigative,	 independent	 mechanisms	
relevant	to	the	development	of	international	criminal	law.	One	such	
innovation	 is	 the	 development	 of	 international	 mechanisms	 that	
collect	evidence	for	the	duration	of	armed	conflict	in	afflicted	states.336	
The	 underlying	 idea	 behind	 such	 mechanisms	 is	 for	 state	 and	
international	 actors	 to	 ultimately	 promote	 accountability	 for	 such	
crimes	 through	 a	 variety	 of	 accountability	 mechanisms,	 including	
international	tribunals	and	domestic	prosecutions.337	
Two	prominent	mechanisms	relate	to	Syria	and	Myanmar.338	The	
former,	 established	 in	 December	 2016	 pursuant	 to	 U.N.	 General	




	 335.	 Iain	 Macleod	 &	 Shehzad	 Charania,	 Three	 Challenges	 for	 the	 International	
Criminal	 Court,	 OUPBLOG	 (Nov.	 16,	 2015),	 https://blog.oup.com/2015/11/three	
-challenges-international-criminal-court	 [https://perma.cc/K462-MFCW];	 cf.	 Tessa	




-think-so	 [https://perma.cc/S6YC-7Y4Q]	 (discussing	 that	 Kenya’s	 government	 has	
consistently	argued	that	the	ICC	is	biased	toward	Africans).	
	 336.	 See	 Lara	 Talsma,	 UN	 Human	 Rights	 Fact-Finding:	 Protecting	 a	 Protection	
Mechanism,	20	ILSA	Q. 29	(2012)	(“After	sporadic	use	of	[human	rights	fact-finding]	


















March	 2011	 (IIIM).339	 Its	 formal	 mandate	 is	 to	 collect	 evidence	 of	




cooperation	 in	 Syria-related	 cases.341	 The	 Human	 Rights	 Council	
established	 the	 latter,	 called	 the	 Independent	 Investigative	








to	 the	 reader.	 These	 United	 Nations	 mechanisms	 are	 collecting	
information	to	be	used	in	criminal	prosecutions;	if	such	information	is	
later	 introduced	 as	 evidence	 in	 U.S.	 criminal	 prosecutions	 for	
individuals	in	the	United	States	who	were	alleged	to	have	perpetrated	
crimes	 in	 these	 relevant	 countries,	 and	 the	 United	 States	 has	
jurisdiction	 over	 such	 crimes,	 the	 focus	will	 likely	 turn	 to	 the	 U.N.	
methods	 of	 collection	 and	whether	 such	methods	 violate	 domestic	
norms	 for	 criminal	 procedure	 rights.	 Although	 some	NGOs	 such	 as	
Global	 Rights	 Compliance	 have	 attempted	 to	 codify	 a	 range	 of	
minimum	standards	 for	 the	 investigation	of	 international	crimes,345	
 
	 339.	 Mandate,	 INT’L,	 IMPARTIAL	&	 INDEP.	MECHANISM,	 https://iiim.un.org/mandate	
[https://perma.cc/9BYZ-9PKJ].	
	 340.	 Id.	


















by	 such	 international	 investigatory	 mechanisms.346	 Thus,	 every	
mandate-holder	needs	to	decide	such	standards	for	itself.	In	the	case	
of	the	IIIM,	it	has	yet	to	clarify	any	procedural	guidelines	relating	to	
the	 mechanism’s	 evidence-gathering	 and	 review	 functions.347	






remains	 an	 open	 question.	 Very	 likely,	 defendants	 will	 assert	 that	
introduction	 of	 such	 information	 would	 shock	 the	 conscience,	 or	
offend	some	other	set	of	rights.	Future	research	will	 illuminate	 this	
intriguing	 procedural	 question,	 at	 the	 intersection	 of	 U.S.	 criminal	
prosecutions	and	emerging	 international	 criminal	 legal	 institutions.	
But	 a	 core	 criminal	 procedure	 approach,	 rooted	 in	 the	 tripartite	
methodology	described	above,	will	provide	the	most	effective	means	
of	 safeguarding	 criminal	 defendant	 rights	 in	 this	 emerging	
transnational	criminal	space.	
		CONCLUSION			




meaning	 of	 the	 due	 process	 clause	 of	 the	 Fourteenth	 Amendment.	
Eleanor	 Roosevelt	 presented	 this	 issue	 to	 U.S.	 State	 Department	
diplomats	when	creating	the	United	Nations	UDHR,	and	U.S.	senators	
debated	 it	 before	 giving	 advice	 and	 consent	 to	 the	 ratification	 of	
ICCPR.	And	the	question	arises	today	when	U.S.	prosecutors	and	law	





	 347.	 See	 Methods	 of	Work,	 INT’L,	 IMPARTIAL	&	 INDEP.	MECHANISM, https://iiim.un	
.org/working-methods/	 [https://perma.cc/7A98-KXD6]	 (“Once	 a	 final	 version	 is	
adopted,	 the	 Methods	 of	 Work	 will	 be	 disseminated	 among	 various	 stakeholders,	







procedure.	 This	 standard	 both	 upholds	 defendants’	 fundamental	
rights	 and	provides	 enough	 flexibility	 to	 facilitate	 cross-border	 law	
enforcement	 realities.	 The	 approach	 already	 manifests	 itself	 in	
incorporation,	human	rights,	and	electronic	evidence	doctrine;	it	must	
also	 be	 applied	 to	 foreign	 evidence	 material	 to	 conviction,	 foreign	
judgments	 material	 to	 sentencing,	 and	 extradition.	 Political	 theory	
bolsters	 this	 approach,	 in	 which	 the	 three	 government	 branches	
evaluate	 rights	 rooted	 in	 constitutional	 criminal	 procedural	
guarantees,	international	human	rights	standards,	and	a	functionalist	
assessment	rooted	in	comparative	law.	This	framework	then	informs	
U.S.	 engagement	 with	 international	 criminal	 tribunals	 and	
investigative	mechanisms.	
	
 
